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Preliminary Thoughts on Some Unresolved Questions Involving
the Law of Anticipatory Self-Defense*
by Rex J. Zedalis**
As articulated in 1842 by U.S. Secretary of State Webster in diplomatic
correspondence to representatives of the British government, in connection with the now famous Caroline incident, traditional international
law permitted the use of armed force in anticipation of an attack whenever there existed a "necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming,
leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation."' There is
no universal agreement on whether the traditional right, paraphrased by
commentators as requiring a threat of imminent attack,2 survived the
* This article, completed in April 1986, is in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of the Science of Law in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University. Earlier drafts
benefited from the insightful review of Richard N. Gardner and Oscar Schachter of Columbia
University, and W.T. Mallison, Jr. of George Washington University. Any errors or omissions
remain my own.
** Associate Director of the National Energy Law and Policy Institute and Associate Professor
of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. Cutting Fellow in International Law (1980-1981),
J.S.D. candidate, Columbia University; LL.M. (with highest honors), George Washington University, 1978; J.D., Pepperdine University, 1976; B.A. (cum laude), California State University, 1973.
Attorney-Advisor, Foreign Agriculture Division, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 1978-1980; Research Associate, International and Comparative Law Program, George
Washington University, 1978-1979; Office of the General Counsel, U.S. International Trade Commission, 1977-1978.
1 Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox, (Apr. 24, 1841) 29 BRI. AND FOREIGN ST. PAPERS
1129, 1138 (1840-41).
2 See eg., M. McDOUGAL AND F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
231 (1961); Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by IndividualStates in InternationalLaw,

II Rec. des Cours 455, 498 (1952); W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 259 (1964); D. BowErr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 191-192 (1958);
Fawcett, Intervention in InternationalLaw: Some Recent Cases, II Rec. des Cours 347, 361 (1961);
J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 244 (1954); Schachter, The Right of
States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1634-1635 (1984); Schachter, In Defense of
Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 113, 135 (1986). The idea of "imminence" would
appear designed to capture both of the conditions on "necessity" established by Webster's formulation of the traditional standard found in the Caroline case. Imminence allows for the recourse to
peaceful means contemplated by the condition "no choice of means." It also allows for the urgency
or immediacy contemplated by the language "no moment for deliberation." This article deals with
these two aspects of imminence in the context of the language of Webster's formulation. Thus,
temporal proximity is discussed in Section II and recourse to peaceful means is discussed in Section
V. Since the idea of imminence undoubtedly reflects both topics, their discussion in separate portions of the article should not be taken to imply that imminence reflects only temporal proximity.
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adoption in 1945 of the U.N. Charter.' But even among those who contend that the traditional law still obtains, there has been precious little
discussion of three points which recent events suggest are of distinct relevance to the law of anticipatory self-defense.
The first is raised by the Israeli aerial attack of June 7, 1981, against
the Tamuz I nuclear reactor in Baghdad, Iraq.4 That point involves
whether a state faced with developments in another state which are said
to pose a threat of actual attack at some distant future time may properly
invoke anticipatory self-defense to justify immediate recourse to armed
force,5 if deferring invocation until the threat matures would result in the
force then required to be used, producing much greater destruction than
would otherwise occur. In defense of the aerial attack, which was carried
out by F15 and F16 aircraft supplied by the United States, the Israeli
government reported that "[s]ources of unquestioned reliability told us
that the [reactor] was intended ... for the production of atomic bombs.
The goal for these bombs was Israel." 6 Additionally, Yehuda Blum,
Israel's permanent representative to the United Nations, indicated in the
Security Council that had his country waited until the reactor had become capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear fuel, "any attack
would have blanketed the city of Baghdad with mass radioactive fallout,"
killing "tens of thousands." 7 As it stood, the attack killed only three
Iraqi civilians and one French technician.8 Notwithstanding the attractiveness of Israel's argument, a threat of actual attack at some distant
future time would seem unable to be considered "imminent," a threat
leaving "no moment for deliberation."
The second point, which is closely related to, yet clearly distinct
from that just mentioned, involves whether a distant future threat faced
3 Compare M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, id. at 232-41, and D. Bowett, id. at 188-89 with I.
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 272-78 (1963) and L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 141-45 (1979).
4 See Mallison and Mallison, The IsraeliAerial Attack of June 7, 1981, Upon the Iraqi Nuclear

Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense?, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417 (1982); D'Amato Israel'sAir
Strike Upon the IraqiNuclearReactor, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 584 (1983); Note, The Sun Sets on Tamuz
I: The IsraeliRaid on Iraq's NuclearReactor, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 86 (1983); Note, NationalSelfDefense in InternationalLaw: An Emerging Standardfor Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187
(1984).
5 See text accompanying infra notes 119, 120 on need for a proportionate response preceded by
peaceful resolution.
6 N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, at A8, col. 1.
7 U.N. Doc. S./P.V. 2280, at 52 (1981), cited in Mallison and Mallison, supra note 4, at 435, n.
58.
8 Interview with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Issues and Answers (June 28, 1981) (Television broadcast by American Broadcasting Company). On the air strike generally, see N.Y. Times,
June 9, 1981, at A8, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 10, 1981, at A12, col. 1; Attack and Fallout, Time
Mag., June 22, 1981, at 24; The IsraeliAir Strike: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 225 (1981).
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by a state invoking anticipatory self-defense may be met with armed
force when the threat is not a threat of actual attack, but a threat to the
security of a nation deriving from immediate efforts to shift the military
balance of power. This point, suggested today by the problems associated with the so-called "window of vulnerability," 9 was originally
presented by the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.10 In the context of that
earlier crisis, President Kennedy's quarantine of Cuba was defended by
some on the basis that any further steps in the direction of the deployment of offensive nuclear weapons in the Western hemisphere would
have created an irreversible situation causing serious disruption to the
balance of power, thereby advancing the Soviet objective of undermining
the security of the United States."1 Any difficulty in attempting to justify
immediate use of anticipatory force against a distant future threat of actual attack is compounded when the threat takes the less distinct form of
jeopardizing the security of a nation by disrupting the military equilibrium. By definition, no threat of imminent "attack" exists. 2
9 See Frye, Strategic Build-Down: A Context for Restraint, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 293, 296-98
(1983-84) describing this as metaphor capturing the fact of a comparatively larger Soviet ICBM
force possibly being able to conduct a first strike against U.S. ICBMs, thereby crippling that force to
the point that it could not respond.
10 On the crisis generally, see R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS (1969); E. ABEL, THE MISSILE CRISIS (1966); A. CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS (1974); and Nathan, The Missile Crisis;His FinestHour Now, 1975 WORLD PoLIcS 268
(Jan.). On legal aspects generally, see Christol and Davis, Maritime Quarantine: The NavalInterdiction of Offensive Weapons andAssociatedMaterialto Cuba, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (1963); Mallison,
Limited Naval Blockade or QuarantineIntrodiction: National and Collective Defense Claims Valid
Under InternationalLaw, 31 GEORGE WASH. L. REv. 335 (1962); McDevitt, The U.N. Charterand
the Cuban Quarantine, 17 J.A.G. 71 (1963); McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantineand SelfDefense, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 597 (1963); Parton, The Cuban Quarantine: Some Implicationsfor SelfDefense, 1963 DUKE L.J. 969; Seligman, The Legality of U.S. QuarantineAction Under the United
Nations Charter,49 A.B.A. J. 142 (1963); MacChesney, Some Comments on the "Quarantine" of
Cuba, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 592 (1963); Fenwick, The Quarantineof Cuba: Legal orIllegal? 57 AM. J.
INT'L L. 588 (1963); Meeker, Defensive Quarantineand the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 515 (1963).
II McDougal, id., at 601-02. See also Mallison, id., at 393-94, and Seligman, id., at 142-45.
The official United States position was based on the collective self-defense under Chapter VIII of the
Charter. See Meeker, id., at 523-24; Chayes, Law and the Quarantineof Cuba, 41 FOREIGN AFF.
550, 554 (1963); and Wright, The Cuban Quarantine,57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 557 (1963). Justifications based on individual claims to anticipatory self-defense have been criticized. See eg., L. Henkin, supra note 3, at 295-296. One suggestion offered to explain why the United States did not
officially invoke Article 51 is because it would have opened the door to similar Soviet claims regarding U.S. missiles then stationed in Turkey. Schachter, In Defense ofRules on the Use ofForce,supra
note 2, at 134. On the Turkish missiles see Hafner, BureacraticPoliticsand "Those FriggingMissiles': JFK, Cuba and US. Missiles in Turkey, 20 ORBIS 307 (1977). The suggestion has also been
made that the U.S. may not have invoked anticipatory self-defense because of a fear that such would
have distended the principle beyond recognition and thus served to weaken the general prohibition
on the use of force. Preserving Order and Security, PROC. OF AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 55, 57 (1981)
(remarks by E. Lauterpacht).
12 See Farer, Law and War in III THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER:
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The third and final point regarding anticipatory self-defense raised
by recent events concerns the acceptability of invoking the right as a justification for the use of force against a threat posed by a defensive military system, as distinguished from one posed by armed offensive
weapons. Now that military technology has progressed to the stage that
increasing attention is being focused on the development and deployment
of both tactical defensive weapons (e.g., precision guided anti-tank weap-

ons, sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons with high single shot kill
probability or fire-and-forget capability, advanced anti-submarine submarines) 3 and their strategic cousins (high-powered microwave devices,
electromagnetic and nuclear pumped x-ray pulse weapons, impenetrable
energy shields), 4 the importance of this point seems clear. To the extent
that one nation is able to harness the defensive technology needed to
insulate itself from the weaponry of an opponent, it presents the possibility that many of the objectives underlying the possession and use of offensive weapons can be accomplished by the possessor of defensive
technology without a single shot-so to speak-being fired.' 5 To maintain that such technology may be subject to preemptive strike runs
squarely up against the need for a threat which is imminent since it
would seem that only offensive systems can pose a threat of such a nature. Additionally, it runs up against both the fact that the Carolineincident itself involved a claimed threat of an offensive nature,' 6 and the fact
that the thrust of the literature concerning anticipatory self-defense has
concentrated on threats of that sort. 7 Given the notion of anticipatory
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 5 at 62-63 (1971)

(noting this problem in context of Cuban Missile

Crisis).
13 For description of some of these weapons, see Evaluation of Fiscal Year 1979 Arms Control
Impact Statement: Toward More Informed Congressional Participationin National Security Pocymaking, House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., CONG. REC. 44 (Comm. Print
1979) [hereinafter 1979 ACIS] (on precision guided anti-tank weapons), 123-25 (on anti-aircraft
weapons); FISCAL YEAR 1982 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT, 97 Cong. 1st Sess., CONG.
REc. 280-84 (1981) [hereinafter 1982 ACIS] (on precision guided anti-tank weapons); 297-301 (on
anti-anticraft weapons); K. TsIis, TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE (1974)
(on antisubmarine submarines).
14 On development in these areas, see 1979 ACIS, id., at 99-101; D. GRAHAM, THE NONNUCLEAR DEFENSE OF CITIES 113-21 (1983); Weiner, Systems and Technology, in BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 49, at 91-7 (ed. A. Carter and D. Schwartz 1984); C. GRAY, AMERICAN MILITARY
SPACE POLICY, 55-69 (1982).
15 A state with the kind of offensive superiority which would permit it to strike another state
with a blow destroying that state's ability to retaliate could, at least in theory, exact concessions by
threatening the use of force. If instead of such an offensive capability, the state possessed a defensive
technology able to neutralize retaliation, then when joined together with a considerably more modest
offesive capability, similar concessions could be obtained by merely threatening force.
16 The threat in that case involved the ferrying of reinforcements and military supplies to Canadian rebels on Navy Island in the Niagara River and then on the Canadian mainland. See Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82-4 (1938).
17 Some literature actually speaks of a threat of imminent offensive attack. See Note, National
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self-defense against a threat of imminent "attack," the latter phenomenon seems quite explicable.
Before examining each of the three foregoing points in detail, this
article opens, in Part I, with some comments on the fundamental question of ascertaining the meaning of words.18 It is suggested that the
words of legal rules seldom have a "plain" meaning. They are most accurately seen as instruments for presentation to officials who make decisions about lawfulness of conduct and the full range of policies and
values which may be implicated. With this theme in mind, Part II then
proceeds to address the matter of anticipatory self-defense against distant
future threats of actual attack. It is suggested that the Caroline standard's reference to "no moment for deliberation" 1 9 need not necessarily
be read as requiring a threat of actual attack sufficiently impending to be
considered "imminent." Since the standard has the effect of minimizing
the chances that defensive force will be used when there is no threat it
serves to preempt, perhaps there is room to argue that defensive force
can appropriately be used against any distant future threat of actual attack, when the existence of such attack is reasonably certain. Part III
focuses on whether preemptive self-defense may be exercised not against
distant future threats of actual attack, but against distant future threats
to the security of a nation stemming from present efforts to disrupt the
military equilibrium. The reference to imminent "attack" is acknowledged as troublesome. Nevertheless, the fact that attention should really
be focused on the existence of "necessity," rather than on the idea of
"attack," is said to raise the possibility that the traditional standard
might be broad enough to include anticipatory action against efforts to
change the military balance of power. In Part IV the point of anticipatory self-defense against a defensive military system is addressed. It is
Self-Defense in InternationalLaw: An Emerging Standardfor a Nuclear Age, supra note 4, at 201

[hereinafter Note NationalSelf-Defense]. Most, however, simply discusses anticipatory self-defense
in the context of an imminent offensive attack. See eg., McDougal, supra note 10, at 600-01; W.
Friedmann, supranote 2, at 259-260; J. STONE, OF LAW AND NATIONS 8-9 (1974); Waldock, supra
note, at 497-98; L. Henkin, supra note 3, at 141-45.
18 This is one of several fundamental or basic questions relative to international law and the use
of force which merits consideration. Others include: whether expansion of existing exceptions to the
rule against the use of force is likely to result in abuse eventually eroding the rule itself. Whether
resisting expansion of exceptions to accommodate behavior states are likely to engage in may eventually reduce respect for other prindiles of international law; whether international law is based on
consent, which may be reavled expressly in things like international conventions, tacitly through
international practice, and if so, Law such a conception of international law accommodates value
changes not yet captured by express or tacit consent; whether a value-oriented approach to law ranks
the value against the use of force as preminent; whether rules restricting force are designed to promote pluralism at the expenses of other values; whether answers to any of these preceding questions
are motivated by implications in areas of international law other than that concerning use of force,
e.g., resource allocation, state responsibility.
19 See Letter supra, note 1.

Vol. 19:129

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

argued that, even though the paraphrasing of the Caroline standard as
referring to "imminent attack" has been conceptualized by commentators in the context of a threat presented by offensive weapons, there may
exist no reason to exclude the possibility that preemptive force can justifiably be used against some defensive military systems, since "necessity,"
again, is the issue of importance. Part V, the last substantive section of
this essay, examines the effect on anticipatory self-defense of a nation's
ability to undertake actions to neutralize a threat before it matures. This
matter is of importance irrespective of whether developments in another
state present a distant future threat of actual attack, a similar threat to
security by upsetting the balance of power, or a threat resulting from the
eventual completion of a defensive weapons system susceptible to appropriate invocation of anticipatory self-defense. The contention advanced
is that measures of neutralization need not be developed as an alternative
to the use of force unless they are absolutely certain to be effective. Even
then, the possibility should perhaps not be foreclosed of there being no
need to develop measures of neutralization, with the immediate use of
defensive force being the appropriate course of action.
I.

THE WORDS OF RULES

20

A quarter of a century ago, one distinguished authority, when discussing whether the traditional right of anticipatory self-defense had surof the U.N. Charter and its reference in Article 51 to
vived the adoption
"armed attack, 2 1 observed as follows:
If, in scholarly interpretation of authoritative myth, any operational
reference is seriously intended to be made to realistically expected
practice and decision, an attempt to limit permissible defense to that
against an actual "armed attack," when increases in the capacity of
modem weapons systems for velocity and destruction are reported almost daily22in the front pages of newspapers, reflects an unsurpassing
optimism.
The importance of this observation is not only in its approval of the
continuation of the traditional right, but is also in its suggestion that
perhaps words mean more than they appear to mean. 23 Unfortunately,
20 The thoughts expressed in this Part are tentative and will be explored in detail in future
articles.
21 U.N. CHARTER art. 51 reads in relevant part: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security."
22 M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, supra note 2, at 238.
23 This sort of relative or contextualist, as opposed to absolute or essentialist, approach is also
reflected in L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 43 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 1968) (in "a
large class of cases - though not for all ... the meaning of a word is its use in the language.")
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the notion of rules as commands or directives is not explicitly rejected in
favor of using rules as rhetorical devices for generating discussion of the
central question-what kind of international community should we have,
with what kind of values given preeminence?2 4 We are not told that rules
of international law are to be understood as vehicles for presentation to
officials who make decisions about the lawfulness of relevant conduct,
the full range of policies and values that, in differing contexts, may be
implicated. 2" The most we are treated to is a hypothesis which leaves a

question. "If, in scholarly interpretation..., any operational reference is
seriously intended to be made to realistically expected practice and decision," then a certain conclusion is said to follow.2 6 But is the hypothesis

itself correct? More precisely, do the rules of international law open conduct they govern to examination of the policies and values which guide
the practices and decisions of states?2 7 Or, alternatively, do the rules
have a certain, precise, concrete or objective meaning which, once discovered, need simply be applied to the factual situation at hand in order
to produce some ineluctable conclusion?
Essential Meaning, or Instruments of Policy and Value Choice?
A certain sense of surprise may be evoked by the notion of legal
standards proving to be facilitators for consideration by decisionmakers
of the values touched by particular conduct and ultimate judgment
thereon.2 8 The objective of international "law" is to cage power, to con-

A.

24 See White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Acts of Culturaland Communal Life, 52
U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 696-98 (1985). On the assessment of values implicated by anticipatory action
discussed in this article, see note 62 infra.
25 But see M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, supra note 2, at 151 where it is indicated that in
drafting rules of law such an approach should be used.
26 But see id.
27 This question naturally raises the issue of whether the use of a policy and value oriented

approach to the interpretation of existing legal standards involves basing the obligation of the standard on something like natural law rather than on consent. See supranote 18 (characterizing this as
a fundamental question). See also supra notes 72 and 86 and accompanying text. In this respect,
however, it should be recalled that the United Nations General Assembly has no authority to take
binding decisions, U.N. CHARTER art. 25 vests that power in the Security Council. Nevertheless, it
has been recognized that Assembly Resolutions and Declarations purporting to flesh-out the broad
standards of the Charter are declaratory of international law. Compare L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0.
SCHACHTER AND H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 104 (1980) (declaratory) with G. Fitzmaurice, Special Report to the Institute de Droit International in LIVRE DU
CENTENAIRE 1873-1973, at 269 (1973) (influences the formative content of the law but does not
make law). See also Western Sahara 1975 I.C.J. 12 (ascribing a developmental role to Assembly
Resolutions and Declarations). Perhaps the same approach can be taken with respect to community
interpretations of antecedent rules when the interpretations reflect a changing assessment of relavant
policies and values.
28 Yet there would seem to be no reason for surprise. If evolving conceptions of policies and
values did not enter into legal decision, there would never be talk of a Warren Court or a Burger
Court, cases like MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (eliminating
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strain efforts to advance parochial national interest, whether those of the
acting state or of the states called upon to pass judgment.2 9 This is best
accomplished when the essential, plain, or objectified meaning of relevant
neutral legal rules or standards is revealed through impartial and reasoned analysis. To permit rules or standards to open the door for consideration of policies and values involved in various situations could make a
travesty of the entire international legal process.30 Law would become
the handmaiden of those who seek to justify why a particular application
of power should be considered permissible.3 1 Equally alarming, it would
be subject to abusive interpretation by decisionmakers who seek to characterize as illegal even the most time-honored forms of conduct, because
of some disapprobation towards the state which has had recourse to
such.32 Conventional wisdom dictates that nothing could be more foreign to any system of order based on law. We are all familiar with the
idea that the principal attribute of law is that it prevents society from
being governed by the whim and caprice of men.3 3
Conventional wisdom, however, may not comport with reality. Law
is simply an instrument of policy,34 a way of expressing how those who
participate in its creation prefer to have their lives ordered.3 5 Of necessity, then, to talk of what the words of a rule or standard mean requires
talk of policies and values, not talk of some discoverable understanding
of how one configuration of various characters of the alphabet produce
an essential difference in meaning from another configuration. Perhaps it
was an appreciation of this fact which led to the observation that those
charged with the responsibility of writing law have as their task, not the
development of a precise and final verbal formula, but rather that of
privity), or Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (recognizing entitlements as constitutionally protected interests), would never occur.
29 Without "law," it would not be difficult to imagine the abuses to which disfavored states
would be subjected. Instances of this sort are already too familiar, even though international rules
presently exist for guiding and assessing conduct. Take for instance the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the
estimation of the states involved, the other side seldom complies with its international obligations.
30 On this already being the situation, see Kennedy, InternationalLegal Education, 26 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 361, 37 (1985) (since the normative moorings of international law are infirm, legal doctrines "dissolve ... into thin disguises for assertion of national interests.")
31 For an illustration in the context of the use of force to overthrow non-democratic regimes,
see Schachter, The Legality of Pro-DemocraticInvasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645, 649-650 (1984)
(value approach to determining lawfulness of use of force presents possibility of abuse) and
Schachter, In Defense of Rules on the Use of Force, supra note 2, at 142-144.
32 Recognizing the extreme animosity between various members of the world community, e.g.,
Israel and the Arab states; the United States and Libya; Nicaragua and its Central American neighbors, suggests this as a distinct possibility.
33 See Marbury v. Madison, 137 U.S. (1 Chanch) where Justice Marshall captures this idea in
his reference to the fact that in the United States we have a "government of laws, and not of men."
34 See L. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 92.
35 See White, supra note 24, at 698.
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presenting, in broad outline, "to the attention of officials who must reach

a decision about... lawfulness or unlawfulness..., the different variable
factors and policies that, in differing contexts and under community perspectives, rationally bear upon their decision... -36 The point made here
is not complex. Both in reading law and in writing it, the struggle is with
policies and values, not with words. Words merely represent a way of
permitting the inquiry into policies and values to begin and to allow that
inquiry to be carried to its ultimate conclusion.37
B.

Treatment of Words in InternationalPractice

No matter how "scientific" the analytical methodology applied by
those who believe words have an essential meaning is claimed to be, the
diametrically opposed conclusions arrived at by governments and scholars regarding the lawfulness of particular international events belies that
the words of legal rules or standards are not so treated in actual practice.
If every international legal standard had a plain meaning, there would
seem to be little possibility, short of a misunderstanding about what legal
standard applied or what factual events actually occurred, for divergent

conclusions regarding the status under the law of particular conduct.38

36 M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, supra note 2, at 151.
37 Without attempting to determine the relative persuasiveness of the approach that legal decisionmaking can be impartial, even though its task is to choose between various policies, cf G.
CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1014 (1973) (acknowledging the entry of policies, at least to the extent that they have been "fitered through the
facts of ... previously decided cases"), or, alternatively, that it can never be anything more than
politics in a more structured and sophisticated garb, see Hutchison and Monahan, Law, Politics,and
the CriticalLegal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv.
199, 206 (1984), Kairys, Law andPolitics, 52 GA L. REv. 243, 248 (1984), and on the international
front, Boyle, Ideals and Things: InternationalLegal Scholarship and the Prison-houseof Language,
26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327, 351-52, it would seem clear that the notion - or myth, if you so please - of
legal standards having essential, plain, or neutral meanings has endured for several reasons. First,
viewing an international standard or rule as neutral suggests that results produced through the application of the standard or rule will be fair, thereby enhancing the likelihood of states submitting to
the regime of international law. Second, by promoting the image of fairness, the idea of an essential
meaning helps minimize the possibility that a state may feel it has not been impartially treated, thus
leading it to raise a question of obligation: Is international law "law"? And finally, by avoiding the
relationship between law and values, the notion of neutrality has prevented attention from being
deflected from the shared goal of "peaceful change," change wrought through international systems,
rather then through military power, see M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, supra note 2, at 129-30; G.
TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 251-52 (1974); and Tunkin, InternationalLaw in the
InternationalSystem, 147 Rec. des Cours 1 (1975) (international law to play peacekeeping role while
transition is made from capitalism to socialism).
38 This is, perhaps the distinguishing attribute of science: its immutable principles produce
results which time, place, nor person seem to affect. Law, on the other hand, is not science. See 0.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAv 1 (1881) stating:
The object of this book is to present a general view of the Common Law. To accomplish
the task, other tools are needed besides logic. It is something to show that the consistency
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Scientific analysis should result in parallel conclusions among those who
consider the particular problems being addressed. Yet all one need do to
appreciate the degree to which law is seen as an instrument for policy or
value choice is to recall the irreconcilable assessments of the Axis powers
and the International Military Tribunal (IMT) concerning specific events
in the Second World War,3 9 of East and West Soviet action in Hungary
(1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979), ° of commentators regarding the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle-East, 41 and
of scholars reflecting on recent events in Grenada (1983) and Nicaraof a system requires a particular result, but it is not all. The life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and
political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the
story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it
contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.
See also Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, reprinted in G. Christie, supra note
37, at 648, 656, stating that behind the logical form of legal reasoning: "lies judgment as to the
relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often on inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give
any conclusion a logical form."
39 On Nazi claims to have legitimately invoked anticipatory self-defense in attacking various
nations, claims rejected by the IMT for Nuremberg, see I. Brownlie, supra note 3, at 258 (attack on
Soviet Union); M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, supra note 2, at 232 (attack on Norway). On Nazi
claim to make the decisive and unreviewable decision regarding whether invocation of anticipatory
self-defense legitimate, claim rejected by the IMT for Nuremberg, see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at
237-39. On a Netherlands claim that a declaration of war against Japan was taken in contemplation
of an imminent attack against the Netherlands East Indies, claim accepted by the IMT for Far East,
see I. BROWNLIE, id.
40 Soviet scholars argued the lawfulness of the invasion of Hungary. See HISTORY OF SOVIET
FOREIGN POLICY: 1945-1970 at 311-18 (B. Ponomaryov, A. Gromyko, V. Khvostov ed., D.
Skvisky, trans. 1973). Others disgree. See e.g., Wright, Intervention, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 274-76
(1957) (presumption of illegality). On the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviets also suggested
lawfulness. See Subcomm. on National Security and Int'l Operations of the Senate Committee on
Gov't Operations, Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev Doctrine, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14-18 (Comm.
Print 1969) reprinted in 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 290-94 (1971). The
United States found the invasion to violate the U.N. Charter. See remarks of Secretary of State
Rusk before the General Assembly, id. at 294-95 (1971). The 1979 invasion of Afghanistan was also
justified in the estimation of the Soviets. See Harrison, DatelineAfghanistan: Exit Through Finland?, 41 Foreign Pol'y 163, 173-74 (1980-81). Others objected. See PreservingOrder andSecurity,
PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 55, 58-65 (1981) (remarks ofE. Lauterpacht and remarks of D. Bowett).
41 On the 1956 conflict, see e.g., 11 U.N. SCOR (748th mtg.) (1956), reprintedin L. SOHN, THE
UNITED NATIONS IN ACTION 112, 114 (1968) (remarks of Mr. Loutfi, Egypt), 115 (remarks of Mr.
Eban, Israel). See generally Finch, Post-Mortem on the Suez Debacle, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 376 (1957);
Wright, supra note 40. On the 1967 war, see 12 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 40, at 170 (both sides
justify actions as self-defense). On the armed conflict in Lebanon in 1982, see S. MALLISON AND W.
MALLISON, ARMED CONFLICT IN LEBANON, 1982: HUMANITARIAN LAW IN A REAL WORLD SET-

13-35 (1983) (Israeli action illegal); U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2375, at 33 (Security Council Provisional
Record, June 6, 1982) (remarks of Israeli Ambassador Blum; action lawful self-defense).
TING
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gua.42 The variety in the conclusions arrived at may well suggest the
existence of undisclosed motivations, motivations which have their generative source in the central matter of choice between competing policies
and values.4 3
C. Can It Be Any Other Way?
As much as we would undoubtedly relish avoiding the agony associated with recognizing that the words of rules dictate assessment and reassessment of policies and values and choices among them, the agony may
be something with which we must learn to live. Words, the instruments
of human expression, may well be incapable of conveying ideas with the
same precision and completeness as when they were formulated in the
mind of the originator. If this is so, the search for an essential, plain, or

objective meaning may always prove frustrating. Much of language is
ambigous44 or vague. 4 5 And even when that which is selected to express

42 See Moore, Grenadaand the InternationalDouble Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1984)
(invasion lawful); Boyle, et. al., InternationalLawlessness in Grenada,78 AM. J. INT'L L. 172 (1984)
(invasion unlawful). On Nicaragua, see Note, The Briar Patch of Reality: A Legal Analysis of the
Mining of Nicaragua'sHarbors, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 169 (1985).
43 The use of force is not the only area where such motivations may exist. In the area of the
"sources and evidence" of international law similar motivation may also appear. For example, perhaps the inclination to use the disparities between lesser developed nations and socialist states, on the
one hand, and Western market economy states, on the other, for the purpose of reforming existing
international legal standards is what has motivated Soviet scholars to urge a more flexible approach
to law-making by international organs. Compare G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
165, 170, 172 (W. Butler trans. 1974) (Resolutions of the General Assembly viewed as authoritative
whenever "generally accepted" with the Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 1 54-9 (giving authoritative force to Resolutions of the General Assembly when adopted by consensus). Similarly, it may be
Soviet apprehension over the impact of liberal democratic theory which has led to it arguing that the
reference in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 54 Stat. 1055, T.S. No.
933, 3 Bevans 1179, to "general principles of law" does not include general principles of municipal
law. See G. TUNKIN, DAG VOLKERRECHT DER GEGENIVART 125-27 (Wolf trans. 1963), reprinted
in L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER, H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 77-8 (1980). See M. VIRALLY, THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 3.21 (Sorensen ed.
1968).
44 See G. Christie, supra note 37, at 824, n. 96, for an excellent illustration of ambiguity in a
notice posted for hunters. The notice read: "Please do not ask permission to hunt." Obviously this
could be, and was, read to have two distinct meanings.
45 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 5 provides Congress with the power: "To coin Money...." In
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, the Supreme Court struck down Congressional reliance
on this power as the basis for attempting to make paper money legal tender. II M. HOWE, JUSTICE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS 52 (1963), attributes to Justice Holmes a letter

in 4 AMER. U.L. REV. 768 (1870), in which the Hepburn decision is praised on the following basis:
It is hard to understand when a power is expressly given, which does not come up to a
required height, how this express power can be enlarged as an incident to some other
express power. The power to "coin money" means, I take it ... (1) to strike off metallics
medals (coin), and (2) to make those medals legal tender (money). I cannot therefore, see
how the right to make paper legal tender can be claimed for Congress...
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an idea is so clear as to leave no question about the meaning of the words
selected, holding that meaning to be the one emanating from the words
can lead to absurd results, simply because that meaning may fail to capture the full range of values considered by those engaged in the constitutive process of law-making. One primitive example from everyday life
appears to suggest this conclusion.
As might well be imagined, it is not uncommon for parents raising a
child to give a rather simple instruction the first time the child displays
both the will and capability to repair from the house without the parent.
The instruction is clear, direct, and emphatic and usually is something
like: "Never go out of the house without your mother or father." The
use of the word "never" prevents the instruction from being ambiguous
and thus able to be understood as meaning contradictory things.46 Similarly, it also prevents the instruction from having the open-textured nature of standards which are vague and thus susceptible to being
understood as dealing with only a limited universe of situations.4 7 To
proponents of plain meaning, "never" means never. However, the policies or values which served to impel the articulation of the standard-in
particular the policy or value of promoting the child's bodily safetysuggests something much less inclusive.4" Surely no parent would insist
that their child contravened the instruction if the house were on fire and
the child fled outdoors to avoid injury. As plain as the word appears,
"never" does not always mean never. The full sense of any word requires
references to policies, values, and context.
D. Problems Associated With Essential Meaning
Apart from the peculiar results which plain meaning can produce, it
also has the effect of rigidifying ideas. When one views words as having
an essential meaning, a meaning that does not depend on the policies or
values the words implicate, the words obtain a certain inflexibility, a lack
This is a classic example of an instance where vague terms were viewed as having certainty. See
Knox v. Lee and Parkerv. Davis, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, overruling Hepburn. See also Thayer, Legal
Tender 1. HARV. L. REV. 73 (1887) (pointing out Holmes' error).
46 See supra note 44, at 822-24.
47 Id. at 823.
48 While some may claim the example of the parental instruction is inapposite when concerned

with the meaning of "legal" standards, recall the First Amendment, U.S. CONST. AMEND. I: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.. ." (emphasis added).
On its face, this legal standard seems just as clear. Yet it, too, has been read as not meaning what it
says. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (J. Holmes' fire in a crowded theatre example); B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A TEXT3OOK 251 (1972). Expressing the view that
the First Amendment means what it says, see Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36
(1961) (J. Black's dissenting opinion). On Black's approach, see Cahn, Justice Black and First
Amendment "Absolutes". A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549 (1962).
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of capacity to be receptive to changing conditions.49 As a consequence,
the passage of time may mean they will give rise with increasing frequency to disputes; disputes which indicate that law is becoming or has
become inconsistent with the way in which the regulated community prefers to arrange its affairs. Of itself, the inconsistency may be the result of
law's effort to restrain conduct argued by some to be undesirable or unac-

ceptable. While such arguments may have merit, it would seem wise to
guard against inconsistency which leads to questions about the fairness of
the legal system. 0 It may well be that at some point such questions
might result in reduced respect for legal standards that would otherwise
be observed.5 1 Wondering about fairness, a state may find it easier to
violate rather than to respect principles which seem inconvenient or outof-line with perceived interests.5 2
The fact that international law lacks a system of certain, swift, and
externally imposed sanctions makes the problem of whether the absence
of perceived fairness can lead to law violation, one of tremendous impor-

tance.53 To be sure, the international legal system is not completely
without a set of direct and formal sanctions. At least in theory, the
United Nations is empowered to punish transgressions of international
law.54 However, the most common form of sanction the international

system imposes for law violation is informal, slow to occur, and indirect.55 It is found in the reprisal actions of individual states.5 6 Endeav-

49 See M. McDOUGAL AND F. FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 56-7. On the desire to guard
against inflexibility in the context of effort in the late-1950s to define "aggression," see statements by
the United States representative, Mr. Klutznick, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.519, at 14-18 (1957), and the
representative from Great Britain, Mr. Vallet, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.523, at 2-5 (1957), made before
the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly. Discussing the general value of using vague standards to avoid rigidity and allow change with the evolution of society, see Christie, Vagueness and
Legal Language, 48 MINN. L. REv. 885-890 (1964).
50 See G. CHRISTIE, supra note 37, at 1007-08 (expressing idea that perception of fairness is
important).
51 The relationship between some rules perceived as unfair and respect for other rules is explored in H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 305 (1968) and A. SINCLAIR,
PROHIBrrION: THE ERA OF EXCESs 214 (1962).
52 For an indication that states will violate unrealistic legal standards which are inconsistent
with perceived interests, see NonproliferationTreaty: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., CONG. REC. 129, 139-40 (1960) (statement to R. Strausz-Hupe to
the effect that the United States would have to violate a nonprolification treaty if "a matter of life
and death for the United States" arose). See also MacChesney, supra note 10, at 597 (indicating the
need to make the law of self-defense compact with reality since "states whose survival is threatened
will nonetheless react to such threats" making the response "either outside or above the law.")
53 See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 100-02 (H. Waldoeck, 6th ed. 1963).
54 Schachter, The Right ofStates to Use Armed Force, supra note 2, at 1621-22. See also Fitzmaurice, The Foundationsof the Authority of InternationalLaw and the Problem of Enforcement, 19
MOD. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1956) (noting the United Nations' enforcement powers do not extend to all
"law-breaking as such").
55 J. BRIERLY, supra note 53, at 101 (sanctions are "precarious in their operation"). See also
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oring to deter violation in the future, individual states suffering the effects
of earlier actions inconsistent with international law may take responsive
action. Various types of retaliation such as refusal to honor legitimate
claims submitted by the violating state or pursuit of conduct inconsistent
with obligations owed to the violating state may be invoked. Even if such
informal, slow, and indirect sanctions were sure to occur, and there
clearly can be certainty on this score,5 7 the manner in which they come
about may mean that the state which had violated international law will
make no connection with its earlier conduct. 8 If the deterrent capacity
of sanctions is absent, what is left to induce states which view the international legal system as unfair to observe principles that are inconsistent
or out-of-line with perceived interests?5 9 The sanctioning process of international law makes the extent to which the rules or standards of the
system reflect ever changing preferences toward differing policies or values a matter of critical significance.
E.

Identification and Balancing of Relevant Policies and Values

Acknowledging that the words of rules are merely vehicles for presentation to officials who make decisions the full range of policies and
values that may be implicated, and that this is the way it must be, should
be, and is, directs attention to the matters of central importance: What
policies and values are involved in various situations, and which should
prevail when several conflict. Obviously, the policies and values implicated by anticipatory self-defense include the policy against the use of
force (both with regard to frequency and intensity) and the policy in
favor of defense of self. There may be dispute about what others should
be referenced, 6" but since the use or non-use of force in self-defense has
H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 282 (4th ed. 1967) (indicating connection between
balance of power and the "attempt and success" of sanctions).
56 See 0. LISSITZYN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 5 (1951) ("disadvantages incurred by [the] breach [of international law]," in the form of reactions from other states); Schachter,
The Right ofStates to Use Armed Force,supra note 2, at 1623-24 (responses of other states and the
public affect what states do).
57 On what may increase the chance of certainty, see J. BRIERLY, supra note 53, at 102 (relative
power vis-a-vis the violator state); H. MORGENTHAU, supra note 55, at 282 (suggesting same
position).
58 To overcome the problem of "connection" associated with the indirectness and lack of celerity in the sanctioning process, every nation taking a sanction should make it absolutely clear exactly
what unfortunate act generated the sanction.
59 Scandinavian "legal realists" might suggest the principles will be obeyed out of a sense or
feeling that it is right to obey. See generally A. Ross, Tu-Tu, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812 (1957); A.
HAGERSTROM, INQUIRIES INTO THE NATURE OF LAW AND MORALS (C. Broad trans. 1953) (discussing a cognitive impulse to obedience which is engendered simply by a command or directive).
60 The list could be endless, but surely would include economic security, intellectual freedom,
basic health, political and cultural diversity, etc.
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impact on the quality of life generally, other values are clearly involved.6 1
When any of the values involved conflict, decisionmakers who pass upon
lawfulness must make a choice, and choice is the basic element of the
process of making (in its initial articulation) or remaking (by way of interpretation) all rules of law.62

Certainly, there is no way to empirically verify that an ethically

"correct" choice has been made between one value or group of values
and another. Even assuming a process in which every official or body
fixed with the responsibility of choosing between various policies and values performed conscientiously and without predilections towards those

whom their decisions would affect,63 the choice takes place with nothing

but the fallible power of human reason to suggest that the choice which is
made is right." Unlike some aspects of science, there is no litmus test by
which to judge the correctness of the selection between values. 5 If there
is reason to avoid complete dispair, it could well be that by struggling
intellectually and emotionally with the problem of resolving conflicts between various policies and values, a greater sensitivity or humaneness is
acquired. 6 Presumably that attribute, fashioned in the context of passing upon the lawfulness of conduct of others, will guide the decisions of
61 It should be noted that any attempt to enumerate the values involved in instances where
force is used in self-defense necessarily reflects the political, moral, and cultural biases of the one
constructing the list. Additionally, as suggested, the values involved may be affected directly by the
use of defense force (e.g., force and in self-defense touch the values against the use of force and in
defense of self) or affected only indirectly (e.g., in using defensive force a state may allow for the
promotion of economic or wealth values that would otherwise be disadvantaged if the state had to
forego the use of force for the development of countermeasures able to neutralize the threat it faced;
see infra Part V).
62 See text accompanying supra notes 33-37. It should be noted that this article does not attempt to thoroughly identify and balance all the values implicated by the various circumstances in
which anticipatory action may be involved. Witness the "preliminary" nature of the thoughts expressed. Though various values are referred to in the context of the specific problems examined in
Sections II-V, and some attempt is made to balance the values referenced, the conclusions suggested
should be taken as tentative.
63 In view of the fact that international decisionmakers have a dual role to play, one which is
national and narrow, and another which is international and broad, there will be many instances
when international judgment is affected by the narrow, national interest. On the dual role of decisionmakers, see M. McDOUGAL AND F. FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 39-40.
64 This, however, should not be permitted to serve as a justification for a cavalier approach
toward policy and value choice.
65 One should not be misled into thinking that science always has available a way of verifying
postulated theories. In the area of high energy physics, for example, the "unification theories" seeking to bring together discovered physical phenomena, e.g., time, space, gravity, are frequently regarded as not susceptible to verification in the classic sense. Some have therefore been led to think
that Keats' idea of "Beauty is truth; truth is beauty" has applicability. Verification is thus said to
perhaps rest on the internal elegance of a proposed unification theory.
66 See G. TINDER, POLITICAL THINKING: THE PERRENIAL QUESTIONS, 16-18, 189-200 (2d.
ed. 1974). The change in the public's perception of ethnic and sexual groups witnessed in the last
thirty years seems as much the result of widespread discussion of the subject of equality as of any
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the states who choose between various conflicting policies and values
when they give consideration to acting in a manner affected by international law.67 To the extent that this occurs, it would seem a gross mischaracterization to conclude that policy and value choices made without
the benefit of certainty regarding their correctness are nothing but wasteful expenditures of time. Perhaps it seems trite to say, but every moment
spent on improving the sensitivity and humanity of mankind may well be
a moment well spent.

II.

DISTANT FUTURE THREAT OF ACTUAL ATTACK

With these skeletal observations on whether the words of rules mean
what they appear to mean, let us proceed to address the problem of defensive action against distant future threats of actual attack. With regard
to that matter, there is no denying that the fashion in which the traditional standard of anticipatory self-defense is cast presents a substantial
problem. To say that there must exist a necessity which leaves "no moment for deliberation" implies the need for a high degree of urgency, an
immediate proximity in time. Thus it is understandable that commentators have characterized this exacting formulation as one which requires
an imminent threat.6 8 Yet unless one is prepared to view the words used
in the formulation of the standard as more determinative than the values
the standard implicates, one cannot help but conclude that such characterization may not precisely describe the instances when anticipatory
self-defense may be properly invoked. In order for that right to be so
invoked, there is no need to do as some have suggested and change the
law.69 As presently formulated, anticipatory self-defense might well be
viewed as including permission to act against some distant future threats
of actual attack.
demonstrable evidence on that score. Simply by talking about and struggling with the problem,
perceptions of equality have been changed.
67 Because of the dual role of international decisionmakers, see M. McDOUGAL AND F. FELIsupra note 63, those who have struggled with policy and value choices in the context of
assessing the lawfulness of the conduct of others may see an increased sensitivity to important values
affect their own decisions regarding their own behavior in specific situations. This may also come
about because states function from time to time as both decisionmakers and claimants. Consequently, they appreciate that the values they suggest should be preferred when they assess a claim are
the same values which may be applied whenever they make a claim. The reciprocal nature of this
process results in the more widely shared values being preferred.
68 See authorities cited supra note 2. See also Note, NationalSelf-Defense, supra note 4, at 207
(suggesting McDougal's Cuban quarantine approach leaves the reference to imminent meaning "the
moment of last opportunity to eliminate [a] threat"). Recall that "imminence" also captures the idea
of recourse to peaceful means. See supra note 2, second paragraph.
69 See Note, id. at 200-17 (viewing the "imminency" requirement as one of temporal proximity,
then arguing that in certain instances it should be relaxed and the U.N. Charter should be amended
to reflect this fact).
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Imminence: A Method of Minimizing Mistake
The right of a state to defend itself against an existing attack or an
anticipated threat of actual attack is surely entitled to be highly ranked
among the litany of rights held by members of the international community. This proceeds from the fact that the absence of an international
body capable of effectively protecting every member of the community of
nations from threats highlights the importance of the value of defense of
self. What would seem to assure that the right to act to protect one's self
is recognized as the most fundamental of rights7" is that without it, territorial integrity and political independence could be impaired. The result
is that other rights inuring with sovereignty might prove short-lived.
The rule of the Caroline incident recognizes the position of primacy of
anticipatory self-defense by crystalizing the notion that force may be
used before the effect of an external danger is felt. A word formula might
then be fashioned to commit the right to the corpus of general international law. Nothing, not even the fact that the authoritative statement of
the right is expressed in restrictive terms, should be allowed to deflect
attention from this essential point. The principal contribution of the
Caroline incident is to be found in its recognition of the right to act in
advance, not in its restriction of the instances when that right may be
exercised.7 1
Bearing this in mind, it must nevertheless be acknowledged that the
restrictive terms used in the traditional standard have undoubted effect
on the overall configuration of the law of anticipatory self-defense. The
requirement that there exist a necessity "leaving no moment for deliberation" cannot simply be read out of the traditional formulation. Conceivably it was inserted for some reason and therefore its effect on
anticipatory self-defense must be taken into account. The inclination
may be to view the reason for the requirement's insertion as evidenced by
the meaning of the restrictive language itself. Thus can be explained the
assessment that anticipatory self-defense requires the existence of an "imminent" threat in order to justify its invocation. The evident intent of
the Caroline standard, and the restatement of that standard by commentators, stresses the immediacy of an attack. An additional assessment,
however, would be obtained by recognizing that acceptance of the notion
that a state may preempt the use of force raises the risk that such force
may be used mistakenly-where there is no actual attack it serves to pre-

A.

70 See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, pt. 1, ch. XIV (Everyman ed. 1914) (characterizing preservation of self as the "Right of Nature," and the source of the first two precepts of the Law of Nature).
71 See Jennings, supra note 16, at 82 ("It was in the Caroline case that self-defense was changed
from a political excuse to a legal doctrine."). Limitations on self-defense had been suggested considerably before the Carolinecase. See e.g., H. GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI DE PACIS (1625), reprintedin
2 CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 172-75 (J. Scott ed. 1925) (immediate and certain danger from
an identified aggressor).
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empt-and militates in favor of limitations designed to promote the value
against the use of force by minimizing the occasions for mistake. Unless
the latter approach is seen as totally without merit, it may strike the
appropriate balance between the values of defense of self and that against
the use of force.
The very fact that language limiting anticipatory self-defense exists
in the traditional formulation of the right indicates an appreaciation for
the value against the use of force and recognizes the possibility that force
might be used by mistake whenever its use, before the consequences of an
external danger are felt, is permitted. At the same time, it certainly appears that the very words selected to reflect the limitation convey the
thought that temporal proximity is an absolute imperative. The words
could not be more plain. For defensive force to be justified, there must be
a threat "leaving no moment for deliberation." But the notion that resort to anticipatory force must await the existence of a threat of actual
attack considered imminent has the effect of reducing the number of occasions when force is used mistakenly. In doing so, the value against the
use of force is advanced, since force is not used when there is no threat it
serves to anticipate. Given this, it would seem fair to view proximity in
time as nothing more than a way through which the risk that naturally
accompanies a right to act in advance is to be dealt with and the value
against the use of force promoted. Requiring an external threat which is
imminent yields clarity to those factual circumstances which will support
a claim that anticipatory action was justified. However, as long as the
risk of mistake is minimized there may be no reason why the external
threat need be imminent in time. To require that it be so in all cases may
elevate the meaning of the words used to express the limitation on the
right of anticipatory self-defense above the values against the use of force
and in defense of self which the right implicates. In all candor, however,
with the exception of Israel's attack on the Tamuz I nuclear reactor, it is
difficult to identify other instances where state practice indicates a willingness to back away from so elevating those words of limitation.7 2
72 This raises one of the fundamental or basic questions alluded to supra note 18. The question
concerns whether an interpretation of a legal principle, when the interpretation is based on a value
assessment, can reflect an obligation whenever the interpretation is not borne out by state practice or
state pronouncements. Without so much as intimating an answer to so complex and important a
question, any effort to develop an answer would seem required to explore the matter of whether
practice necessarily alters a principle that allows more than states willingly claim. Those familiar
with the development of customary international law will recall that many insist a practice does not
reflect law unless the practice is followed because of a sense of obligation, as distinguished from
political expediency. See e.g., C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 148-49 (Corbett trans. 1957). In line with this idea, if a principle admits of an interpretation permitting more than state practice indicates states are anxious to claim, is the principle
nevertheless narrowed, though the practice is meant to suggest a political choice rather than a sense
of the limitations on legal choice?

19871

B.

PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS

The HumanitarianConsideration

The humanitarian attraction of Israel's claim which relates to the
attack on the Tamuz I nuclear reactor 73 would appear to indicate the
propriety of giving the restrictive language contained in the traditional
formulation the reading suggested. Without intending to pass on the
merits of the factual assertion involved in the Israeli aerial strike,7 4 there
would seem every reason to support the view that it is more preferable to
have defensive force produce minimal damage than it is to have it produce extensive damage. Whenever the accomplishment of that objective
requires action before an external danger proves imminent, the focus of
attention should be on whether the existence of the danger is certain
rather whether than the danger is in the form of an immediate or impending attack. To require a threatened state to refrain from acting until
an external danger becomes imminent seems justifiable in humanitarian
terms only if the very existence of the danger were not certain. 75 But if
one state has embarked on a pursuit designed to culminate in the use of
force against another, a defensive attack taken before the threat matures
enough to satisfy the standard of imminence would seem supported if
that attack would result in much less destruction than an attack put off
until a future point in time. An approach of this sort promotes both the
value of defense of self and that aspect of the value against the use of
force limiting the intensity of coercion.76
This is not to say, however, that a state may properly invoke anticipatory self-defense simply because the defensive force used will produce
less destruction than that used later. In the absence of some certainty
that the use of defensive force would not be mistaken,7 7 the mere fact
that an early use of force would produce less destruction would seem to
supply insufficient justification. The restrictive language of the Caroline
standard favors minimizing the chances of mistake. Thus, it is only
when the objective of damage limitation is joined with the minimization
of mistake that anticipatory self-defense in advance of temporal imminence is justified.
73 Recall the observation of Ambassador Blum that postponing the strike until the reactor had
become "hot" would have killed "tens of thousands." Mallison and Mallison supra note 7.
74 Those who have reflected on the merits of the claim of self-defense have arrived at differing
conclusions. See Mallison and Mallison, supra note 4 (claim of self-defense unpersuasive); Note,
NationalSelf-Defense, supranote 4 (claim persuasive); Note, The Sun Sets on Tamuz I, supra note 4
(claim unpersuasive).
75 This is because refraining from the use of defensive force until the danger becomes certain
promotes the value against the use of force without jeopardizing the value of defense of self.
76 See discussion supra note 62 on the tentative nature of any value assessment suggested in this
article.
77 Clearly, any assessment of this sort would seem to require some reference to the perceived
intentions of the threatening state. This necessarily raises the question of what must be the nature of
the responding state's view that an attack is certain?

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

Vol. 19:129

C. Required State of Mind Reflects Required Level of Certainty
A level of certainty required under international law to minimize the
chances that anticipatory self-defense may be used by mistake would
seem to be reflected in the state of mind of a nation invoking that right.
That the element of state of mind is crucial seems evident. Even the
movement of troops towards a border following their massing nearby, or
the making of final preparations necessary for launching a portion of
one's ballistic missiles, or the existence of any other factual situation one
might conclude satisfies the requirements of imminence, temporal proximity, immediacy of attack, would not entitle a state to use anticipatory
force without some evidence that the indicia of an actual attack were
perceived or apprehended. Though the concept of an "imminent" attack
is admittedly more certain than a state's subjective assessment that it
faces a threat of attack in the distant future, the problem of state of mind
cannot be escaped.
The Caroline offers little help regarding the state of mind required
by international law when invoking anticipatory self-defense. Interest-

ingly enough, once the sources for the proposition that no nation may be
the final judge of the lawfulness of its own actions have been identified,78
few authorities can be found who have sought to go further and deal with
the kind of apprehension needed in order to legitimize resort to force of
self-defense.79 Is it sufficient that a nation honestly believes it faces a
threat of attack? Must the relief be supported by facts subsequently re78 As will be recalled, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty of 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 52, basically outlawed resort to war for the resolution of international controversies. The United States
indicated to several countries that in its estimation the treaty did not prevent resort to war in selfdefense and that every nation "alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse
to war in self-defense." The same view was expressed by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 236-37. In defending some of its actions in World
War II, Nazi Germany advanced a theory of decisive unilateral determination, drawing apparently
on the language just quoted. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER, H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 908, n. 1 (1980). That theory was rejected, with the IMT at Nuremberg stating: "But whether action taken under the claim of self-defense was in fact aggressive or
defensive must ultimately be subject to investigation and adjudication if international law is ever to
be enforced." Quoted in I. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 239. For the same approach taken by the
earlier constituted Lytton Commission investigating the September 18, 1921, Japanese attack on
Manchuria, see I. BROWNLIE, id., at 242 ("the Commission does not exclude the hypothesis that the
[Emphasis added]). This
officers on the spot may have thought they were acting in self-defense ....
same aversion to decisive unilateral characterization has evidenced itself in other contexts as well.
See e.g., FisheriesCase (U.K. v. Norway) [1951] I.C.J. 116, 132 (indicating that municipal law delimitation of offshore areas are permitted, but validity "depends upon international law."
79 But see Note, National Self-Defense, supra note 4, at 208-10 ("reasonable nation"); 1 J.
WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (1904) ("attack reasonably.. .apprehended"); M. MCDOUGAL AND F. FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 230 (observation made that what must be investigated is
"the degree of necessity-as that necessity is perceived and evaluated by the target claimant ......
[Emphasis added]).
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vealed as indicating an actual armed attack was intended by another
state? Will a subsequent factual assessment which indicates that an attack was not intended preclude reliance on anticipatory self-defense, if at
the time it was invoked a reasonable belief existed that an attack would
occur?
As with many areas, those who have at least given passing consideration to such questions appear to be in some disagreement.8 0 In discussing the matter, some have used language which can be understood to
suggest that the appropriate standard is purely subjective.81 Whenever a
state which invokes self-defense honestly believes an attack is certain to
occur, the requisite state of mind exists. Small wonder the very right of
anticipatory self-defense has received less than universal acceptance.8 2
Others who have reflected on the necessary state of mind take the posi80 M. McDOUGAL AND F. FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 230.
81 Id. and id at n. 241. But see McDougal, supra note 10, at 597 (stating the standard as that of
a state which "reasonably decides" activities of another state require self-defense). It's unclear what
the McDougal position, stated here and in supra note 79, should be read as meaning. Presumably
the standard is to be that of reasonable apprehension of an attack. The language referred to in supra
note 79, especially at 230, n. 241, seems to confuse the matter.
82 Many argue that anticipatory self-defense did not survive the adoption of the U.N. Charter.
See Statement of Mr. Castaneda (Mexico) 20 U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm. (886th mts.) at 275, 1 36
(1965); Mr. Rossides (Cyprus) id. (892 mts.), at 325, 55 (1965); Mr. Garcia Robles (Mexico) id.,
1st Comm. (139th mts.) 257-58, 20 (1965); Mr. Vargas (Chile) 21 U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm.
(937th mts.) at 224, 8 (1966); Mr. Alcivar (Ecuador) 22 U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm. (1003d mts.) at
273-74, 1 53 (1967); Mr. Myslil (Czechoslovakia) 23 U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm. (1086th mts.) at 4, 1
30 (1968); Mr. Nachabeh (Syria) id. (1094th mts.) at 4, 27 (1968); Mr. Alcivar (Ecuador)id., Spec.
Comm. on Aggression, U.N. Doc. A/AC 134/SR. 10, at 111 (1968); Mr. Gonzalez Galvez (Mexico)
id., U.N. Doc A/AC. 134/SR. 15, at 146 (1968); Mr. Jahoda (Czechosolovaka) id., U.N. Doc.
A/AC. 134/SR. 19, at 201 (1968); Mr. Gonzalez Galvez (Mexico) id., 6th Comm. (1075 mts.) at 3,
22 (1968); Mr. Nachabeh (Syria) id. (1976th mts.) at 4, 25 (1968); Mr. Houben (Netherlands) id.,
at 6, 1 35 (1968); Mr. El Reedy (U.A.R.) id. (1077th mts.) at 2, 10-11 (1968); Mr. de Lipkowski
(France) id., at 3, 18 (1968); Mr. Alcivar (Ecuador) id. (1078th mts.) at 6, 36 (1968); Mr. Blix
(Sweden) id. (1079th mts.) at 1, 1 6 (1968); Mr. Shahi (Pakistan) id. (1080th mts.) at 9, 1 70 (1968);
Mr. Gonzalez Galvez (Mexico) 24 U.N. GAOR, Spec. Comm. on Aggression, U.N. Doc. A/AC.
134/SR. 30, at 25 (1969); Mr. Gavrilova (Bulgaria) id, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/SR. 33, at 48 (1969);
Mr. Yasseen (Iraq) id., U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/SR. 39, at 120 (1969); Mr. Bavand (Iran) id., U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 134/SR. 41, at 135 (1969); Mr. Diaconescu (Romania) id., at 139 (1969); Mr. Jazic
(Yugoslavia) id., at 140 (1969); Mr. Yasseen (Iraq) id., U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/SR. 47, at 200 (1969);
Mr. Elsheikh (Sudan) id., at 203 (1969); Mr. Alcivar (Ecuador) 25 U.N. GAOR, Spec. Comm. on
Aggression, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/SR. 58, at 53 (1970); Mr. Sepulveda (Mexico) id., U.N. Doc.
A/AC. 134/SR. 60, at 86 (1970); Mr. Kolesnik (U.S.S.R.) id, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/SR. 64, 134
(1970); Mr. Elsheikh (Sudan) id., U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/SR. 66, at 168 (1970); Mr. Yasseen (Iraq)
id., U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/SR. 67, at 7 (1970); Mr. Alcivar (Ecuador) id., at 12 (1970); Mr. Rossides (Cyprus) id., U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/SR. 68, at 17 (1970); Mr. Komatina (Yugoslavia) 26 U.N.
GAOR, Spec. Comm. on Aggression, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/SR. 87, at 69 (1971); Mr. Rossides
(Cyprus) id., at 71 (1971); Mr. Diaconescu (Rumania) id., V.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/SR. 89, at 79
(1971); Mr. Rossides (Cyprus) id., at 82 (1971). See also Report of the Spec. Comm. on Aggression,
23 U.N. GAOR, Agency item 86, U.N. Doc. A/7185/Rev. 1, at 24, 56 (1968); Report of the Sixth
Committee, id., Annexes, Agenda item 86, U.N. Doc. A/7402, at 5, 15 (1968); Report of the Spec.
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tion that the standard has, or should have, an objective as well as a subjective component. s3 Legitimate reliance on self-defense requires that the
state invoking the right actually perceive itself as threatened and that this
perception be based on circumstances which would suggest its
reasonableness.
In common law countries, the municipal law test concerning the
state of mind of an individual invoking self-defense has both a subjective
and an objective component. 84 No person may properly invoke the right
as a justification for the use of force unless that person believes a threat
which warrants defensive measures exists. Furthermore, the belief that a
threat of such a nature exists is insufficient to provide justification unless
a reasonable third party would arrive at the same conclusion. Surely the
basic rationale for such an approach is twofold. First, it curbs resort to
force by eliminating the possibility of advancing post hoc rationalizations
based on after-discovered facts. And second, it curbs resort to force by
eliminating the possibility that the use of force can be justified on the
pretext that action is needed for defensive or protective reasons when no
reasonable person would include such to be the case. The same rationale
is relevant in relations between members of the international community
as well. Indeed, it seems captured by the previously mentioned proposition that no nation may be the final judge of its own actions.8 5
Arguably one might see the idea that no nation is the final judge of
its own actions as not ruling out the possibility that international review
focuses only on determining whether the state claiming to use force in
self-defense perceived or apprehended a threat which warranted defensive action. From this it might be suggested that the requisite state of
mind under international law is purely subjective. To take such an approach, however, would leave open the chance of force being used on the
pretext that defensive action is needed. The result would be a situation in
which the legitimate value of defense of self is perverted in order to circumvent the value against the use of force. To avoid this, the more appropriate reading of international review would be that it indicates that
the required state of mind has both a subjective as well as an objective
Comm. on Aggression, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 19, U.N. Doc. A/8019, 14-15, 42 (1970); id., at 26
72; id., 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 19, U.N. Doc. A/8719, Annex II, App. A, at 16 (1972).
83 See I J. WESTLAKE, supra note 79 (stating a standard which indicates the traditional law
sets forth on objective and a subjective component); I. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 260, 367 (notes
the law should set forth such, but that the traditional standard fails to do so in any clear fashion).
84 On the two-pronged component in United States municipal law, see R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL
LAW 1113-16. For an interesting comparison from an entirely distinct legal system, see Otley and
Zorn, CriminalLaw in PapuaNew Guinea, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 251, 266-67 (1983) (noting that the
defense of provocation has an objective and subjective component), and 276 (noting section 274 of
the Criminal Code allows self-defense, which is written so as to reflect an objective and subjective
component.
85 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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component. The effect of defensive action against a distant future threat
suggests the level of certainty required to justify such can be stated as
that of reasonable certainty.
Reasonable certainty is preferable to any purely subjective standard
(eg., "honest belief" of attack), since it guards against instances in which
states may wish to act just because they feel threatened. The objective
component of the state of mind requirement limits the ability of states to
abuse the subjective component. It is not enough that a state apprehends
an attack. In order for the use of preemptive force to be justified as legitimate anticipatory self-defense, subjective apprehension must be confirmed by objective factors reflective of an attack reasonably certain to
occur. An assessment of such factors would seem to require that the
validity of any claim to use force in anticipatory self-defense be evaluated
in light of the extent of the ideological gulf between the states involved;
the nature of past and current international relations between those
states; the character of the military development causing the claim to
resort to force in self-defense; a comparative examination of the involved
states' existing military strength; an appraisal of the likelihood that other
states might assist either the state claiming self-defense or the state allegedly planning an attack, as well as an evaluation of the military strength
of the assisting states; and, the internal political situation within the state
presumed to be disposed to attack.
The chances seem somewhat minimal that states not holding antithetical ideological beliefs would attack each other. Nevertheless, the
Falkland-Malvinas Islands conflict of 1982 between Great Britain and
Argentina reminds us that it can happen. When, on the other hand, the
ideological gulf is great, the chances of military confrontation increase
substantially. Witness events over the last few years concerning Libya
and the United States. For all that can be said about ideological differences, however, they alone would seldom prove determinative. Of equal
importance would be whether current relations are marked by serious
tensions, like those now apparent between Nicaragua and its neighboring
nations, El Salvador and Honduras, or a formal state of war, like that
which existed between Iraq and Israel at the time the Tamuz I nuclear
reactor was bombed. This is not to say that an attack can never be reasonably certain to occur in the absence of serious tensions or a state of
war. Some have suggested that the optimum time to catch an opponent
by surprise is when relations are excellent and an attack seems distinctly
improbable.86 Going beyond current relations between the states conThe same question referred to supra note 72 occurs here whenever one examines the possibility of giving the Caroline standard a reading that would allow the use of force to redress a military
imbalance. If imbalance is an accepted fact of life, and practice suggests that states do not use
imbalance as justification for a claim of self-defense, how can an interpretation of the Carolineinconsistent with practice be viewed as reflecting the state of the law?
86
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cerned, the nature of past relations, the character of the military development leading to the claim of self-defense, and the general military
situation in the involved states would also reflect on the reasonableness of
a judgment that an attack is certain to occur. Apprehensions conceived
in the context of a history of repeated invasions from particular sources
may be more reasonable than those burdening a nation which historically
has been insulated by geography. Similarly, whether the state benefiting
from the military development which justifies anticipatory action is militarily superior, equivalent, or inferior to the other state, and whether the
development itself is of such a nature as to alter that relation, seems to
bear upon reasonable certainty. Many militarily superior states enjoying
the benefits of new developments, however, live in harmony with weaker
neighbors. This emphasizes once again that any effort to assess the reasonableness of a determination that an attack is certain to occur requires
consideration of more than a single factor.
There are two other factors which would seem to complicate any
effort to assess the reasonableness of such a determination. The first concerns the likelihood that other nations might assist either the state claiming self-defense or the state allegedly planning an attack. The second
concerns the internal political situation within the state presumed to be
disposed to attack some other state. While both factors deal with matters
which are highly conjectural, their relevance seems evident. Is it not difficult to imagine one concluding that an attack is reasonably certain to
occur, when the presumed attacking nation, though ideologically and
historically hostile, as well as militarily superior, is in the throes of a
revolution about to displace the entire political structure with one which
is much more accommodating and pacific? Clearly we can all think of
recent examples where the attitude of a nation towards using force has
changed markedly almost overnight. The most familiar example of a
change resulting in a more liberal attitude towards using force would
have to be the ouster of Shah Reza Pahlavi and the accession of the
Ayatollah Khomeini. This change in an internal political system led to
the recrudescence and accentuation of long-standing problems between
Iran and Iraq, ultimately culminating in the ongoing Iran-Iraq war. Is
not the reasonableness of a determination that an attack is certain to
occur somewhat suspect when the state to be attacked is one which has
many close and powerful allies likely to come to her assistance and inflict
unbearable misery upon the aggressor? While there may well be instances when the likelihood of the infliction of such misery may not prevent the attack, to deny that this affects the reasonableness of a
determination that the attack is certain to occur would seem to deny the
very notion of deterrence.
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III.

THREAT TO SECURITY THROUGH DISRUPTION OF MILITARY

BALANCE OF POWER

From what has preceded, it would seem that the traditional standard applicable to anticipatory self-defense is susceptible to the reading
that a state may take immediate action against threats of actual attack
that will mature only in the distant future. The language of the standard
indicating that the right obtains whenever a threat is imminent can be
viewed as stressing an interest in reducing the chances that force will be
used when there is nothing it really serves to preempt. Ultimately reduction of the chances of mistake is accomplished by faithful attention to
whether a state which has invoked self-defense actually perceived itself as
subject to a threat and whether the international community will conclude that that perception was based on reasonable certainty. But quite
apart from arguments relative to countering threats of actual attack in
the distant future, what about the availability of preemptive self-defense
against threats to a nation's security deriving from disruption of the military balance of power? Can a state justify the use of anticipatory force
when it confronts not a threat of actual attack, but a threat of immediate
efforts to reconfigure the military equilibrium to the disadvantage of its
security? The usual translation of the Caroline standard would seem to
suggest a negative response. States have seen military disequilibrium as
an accepted fact of international life.87 For a threat which jeopardizes
the military equilibrium to warrant resort to force in self-defense with the
prospect of an imminent "attack," an actual application of coercion must
be present. 8
A.

Situations Raising Concern

Disruptions in the balance of power which might threaten a state's
security would seem to fall into three categories. The first category
would involve threats to security which have their origin in third country
political developments that may be said to inure to the benefit of one
superpower and the detriment of another. Typical cases might include
the rise to power of Fidel Castro in Cuba in 1959 and of the Sandinistas
in Nicaragua in 1979. The second category involves indirect threats to a
nation's security resulting from determined efforts to shift the military
balance of power through developments in weaponry. The distinguishing
characteristic of threats of this sort is that a military development aimed
at third states is used to produce a threat to the political security of a
87 See eg., Kaiser and Pincus, 'Shall We Attack America?', Wash. Post., Aug. 12, 1979, at B1,
col. 3, and id. at B4, col. 1 (suggesting an attack "when the Bolshoi Ballet or the Moscow Circus go
touring the United States.")
88 See Farer, supra note 12, at 62-3 ("disequilibrating consequences" are not alone enough
since a state must show threat of imminent attack).
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disadvantaged superpower. An excellent illustration concerns the Warsaw Pact/NATO tank disparities surrounding the "neutron bomb" controversy of the late-1970s. The third category also involves
developments in weaponry designed to disrupt the military balance of
power. But what separates this third sort of disruption from the immediately preceding one is that here the weapons developed are actually
aimed at the disavantaged superpower, thus creating a direct threat to
military as well as political security. One need look no further than the
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the claimed "window of vulnerability"
faced by the United States during the latter-half of the 1980s for familiar
examples.
Each of these categories of disruption to the balance of power is
important in its own right. The only sorts of disruption commented on
here, however, involve the latter two: indirect threats to89political security, and direct threats to military and political security.
The indirect threat to the United States' political security of interest
in the neutron bomb controversy of the late 1970s9" was the product of a
four-to-one superiority in the number of tanks held by Warsaw Pact
forces in the European theatre. 9 1 It was argued that unless neutron
bombs-capable of killing troops while limiting collateral heat and blast
damage to property- -92 were made available to field commanders, credible deterrence to a Soviet directed invasion would be lost. The argument
was based on the fact that NATO would have to select between the obviously unacceptable choice of employing highly destructive standard tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) on its own soil in order to repel a tank
assault uncontained by conventional forces, or using neutron bombs if
Warsaw Pact forces advanced into Western Europe. The latter was
viewed as equally unacceptable since it would result in a quick crossing
of the nuclear threshold, thus risking very early escalation to general nuclear war. 93 With such choices suggesting capitulation or defeat as distinct possibilities, 94 some saw the Warsaw Pact advantage as nothing but
89 The third category, threat to security deriving from third country political developments, is
not examined here because it often involves the topic of intervention in civil war in addition to the
law of self-defense.
90 See Shreffler, The Neutron Bomb for NATO Defense: An Alternative, 21 ORBIS 959 (1978);
Cohen and Van Cleave, In Comment, id., at 967 (1978).
91 Brennan, The Soviet MilitaryBuild-Up and its Implicationsfor the Negotiationson Strategic
Arms Limitations, 21 ORBIS 107, 113 (1977); Evans and Novak, The Heated Debate Over the Neutron Bomb, Wash. Post, Mar. 31, 1978, at A19, col. 5.
92 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PRO/CON ANALYSIS OF THE NEUTRON BOMB 4

(June 27, 1977).
93 Id.
94 Defeat could come about because NATO might refuse to use standard tactical nuclear weapons on its own soil and yet try unsuccessfully to contain Warsaw Pact troops with conventional
forces. Capitulation might come about if it becomes obvious to NATO that its conventional forces
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a part of the larger Soviet strategy to separate and "Finlandize" Western
Europe by using military developments to induce receptivity to Soviet
overtures designed ultimately to jeopardize American political security.9 5
The direct military and political threat to the United States during
the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was said by some to exist in the fact that
development of intermediate range offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba
would have meant the Soviets could have by-passed the Dewline warning
system and grievously reduced United States reaction time to possible
Soviet attack. 96 It has been argued with respect to the so-called "window
of vulnerability" problem that a direct threat to the military and political
security of the United States similarly exists because of Soviet development of a theoretical war-winning capability. 97 Evidence to support this
proposition is found in a strategic balance which envisions the Soviet
with enough fire-power to deprive the United States of the ability to deter
the Soviets from ever launching a nuclear first-strike in an instance where
it would be essential to indicate the seriousness of Soviet interest in an
anticipated concession by the United States. 98 In the estimation of some,
the threat to military security in both cases renders the United States
reluctant to confront the Soviet Union in its efforts to establish a more
favorable "correlation of world forces." 9 9 Over time, political concessions jeopardizing the United States may be found inescapable."° Laboring under the spectre of Soviet nuclear supremacy, concessions harmful
to the United States may very well have to be made.
are not holding and it desires to seek peace on the most favorable terms available. Both possibilities
enhanced the attractiveness of neutron bombs since they can be used at any stage of a conflict and,
presumably, with great success.
95 On this general Soviet approach, see Adelman, Fear,Seduction and GrowingSoviet Strength,
21 ORBIS 743, 751 (1977).
96 McDougal, supra note 10, at 601.
97 See Nitze, Assessing Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente, 54 FOREIGN Aiw. 207, 227
(1976).
98 See, Lehman & Hughes, "Equivalence" and SALTII, 20 ORBIS 1045 (1977); Reflections on
the Quarter: Judging SALT II, 23 ORBIS 251 (1979). The Soviet capability derives from the fact
that a Soviet first-strike would deprive the United States of enough ICBMs to threaten those
landbased missiles held in reserve by the Soviets, thus confronting the United States with the phenomenon of "self-deterrence," since its only course of action would be to launch an SLBM strike
against Soviet urban and industrial centers - an action sure to bring a similar retalitory strike from
the Soviet Union.
99 On the shift in world forces, see Deane, The Soviet Assessment of the "Correlationof World
Forces" Implicationsfor American Foreign Policy, 20 ORBIS 625 (1976).
100 See Nitze, Strategy in the Decade of the 1980s, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 82, 85-6, 90-1, 94-7
(1980). Those occasionally described as "functionalist" might, however, take the position that the
Soviets would never really do anything to the West which might be inimical to Moscow's own economic objectives. For a flavor of "functionalist" underpinnings, see opinion of J. Alvarez, Corfu
Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 39, 43 (stressing social interdependence).
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Need for Threat of "Attack"

As was suggested earlier with the Israeli aerial attack on the Tamuz
I nuclear reactor, put aside the merits of the claims in the neutron bomb,
Cuban Missile Crisis, and window of vulnerability cases. The significance of whether one can show that a military advantage produces a
situation which erodes the security of the disadvantaged state loses its
importance if nothing short of a threat of actual attack warrants invocation of anticipatory self-defense. Judged by the usual recasting of the
Caroline standard offered by commentators, how can the conclusion be
escaped that a disruption to the military balance of power can never present a threat of imminent "attack"? Attack implies the use of military
force by one state against another.10 1 The only conceivable instance in
which a shift in the military balance of power might be said to present a
threat of attack would have to involve a military development accompanied by adequate evidence that the development is a step in the direction
of actual application of military force against the disadvantaged state. 102
Notwithstanding the logic of this approach, sight should not be lost
of what is called for under the traditional standard. No reference is
made in the Caroline to the idea of an attack. For a threat to justify the
use of preemptive force as a defensive, the traditional standard speaks of
the need for a "necessity" leaving no choice of means and no moment for
deliberation. The determinative consideration is the presence of such a
necessity, not the presence of an imminent attack.
But what does it take to make a threat one concerning which it can
be said that a necessity exists to use preemptive force in self-defense?
Clearly, necessity is affected by the requirement that there be no choice
of means (a requirement to be examined in Part V) and the requirement
of no moment for deliberation (a requirement examined in Part II, and
suggested as capable of being read as directed to reduce mistaken uses of
defensive force). Apart from these requirements, however, must there be
something present in the very nature of an external threat in order to
permit the conclusion that the threat is one which creates a necessity to
use force in self-defense? Is it conceivable that that which must be present exists only when the external threat is one of actual attack?
Some might argue that the kind of threat which creates a necessity
justifying the use of armed force in anticipatory self-defense is a threat
101 See L. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 295-96 (Cuban quarantine indefensible on self-defense
grounds); Farer, supra note 12, at 62-3 (basically agreeing with Henkin). But see Farer, id., at 64
(indicating that possibly a threat to balance of power deriving from violation of an arms control
agreement would support use of anticipatory self-defense, notwithstanding idea of imminent "attack"). See Zedalis, On the Lawfulness of Forceful Remedies for Violations of Arms Control Agreements: "Star Wars" and Other Glimpses at the Future, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 73 (1985).
102 See supra Part II.
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which raises a reasonably certain risk'0 3 of territorial diminution or physical injury to a state or its inhabitants, or perhaps even a similar risk of
explicit or subtle imposition of political judgment regarding the manner
in which a state disadvantaged by a shift in the military balance of power
is expected to behave on matters of vital importance."0 4 If such an approach were acceptable, action designed to stop efforts to disrupt a military balance of power would be viewed as lawful. Clearly, however,
legitimization of preemptive action poses a problem since it is the acting
state which, in the first instance, determines whether a matter is of vital
importance, thereby opening the possibility of preemption simply to keep
neighbors weak in order to maintain the benefits deriving from international hegemony. Is the desire to avoid an abuse of the right to anticipate
so intense and deeply rooted that it elevates the value against the use of
force to a position of preeminence? 10 5 Are there no instances in which it
would be appropriate to accept the risk of abuse in order to promote the
value of defense of self? Should the fact that to allow the use of force to
prevent military disruption of the balance of power serves to protect the
security of a state committed to political, economic, and social objectives
which are widely and independently viewed as preferable to those sought
by the state against which the force is used? These are immensely important questions; questions which are never even approached under the
view that "necessity" is wedded with the idea of imminent attack, and
questions which may very well go the heart of what the law in this area is
all about. Beyond these questions, however, there may be other questions which suggest that a standard like that referred to above-a standard which invites a wide-ranging value assessment-may be so slippery
and amorphous as to be unacceptable. Take for instance the question of
whether law should strive to create a certain amount of predictability.106
To the extent that a legal standard calls for the weighing of innumerable
values in seeking to determine the validity of a claim to reliance on anticipatory self-defense, no state can be sanguine as to the outcome of an
effort by the other members of the world community to judge its actions.1 7 Yet how important should the goal of predictability be if a legal
assessment argues for a principle that is inconsistent with realistically
expected state behavior?' 08 Another question affecting acceptability is
103 On the state of mind requirement in general, see text accompanying supra notes 77-85.

104 See M. McDOUGAL AND F. FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 177 (indicating that "political
independence," protected by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, would be violated by "substantial
curtailment of the freedom of decisionmaking through the effective and drastic reduction of the
number of alternative policies open at tolerable costs...")
105 Again, see supra note 62 on the tentative nature of any value assessment suggested in this
article.
106 See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 223-24 (1961).
107 Further compounding the process is the fact that political biases may also affect decisions.
108 See M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (3d ed.
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whether systems of law should endeavor to optimize efficiency in decisionmaking.1 °9 Surely it strains reason to expect the entire universe of
values-values which defy any knowably "correct" prioritization-to be
weighed and reflected upon every time an international dispute arises.
But unless such an impossible task is attempted, what hope remains of
forging a world designed to promote the chance for humankind to realize
its fullest potential?"'
C. Necessity in Context of Balance of Power
Assuming acceptance of the notion that "necessity" for defensive
uses of force can exist in the context of weaponry developments which
shift the military balance of power, there is still a further question to
complete inquiry. Specifically, the question involves whether developments which produce an indirect threat to a state's political security (e.g.,
Warsaw Pact tank superiority and neutron bomb controversy) or a direct
threat to a state's military and political security (e.g., the Cuban Missile
Crisis and the "window of vulnerability" case), can factually create a
necessity sufficient to warrant resort to preemptive self-defense? Put another way, if one accepts the idea that the doctrine of anticipatory selfdefense is broad enough to include action against developments which
threaten to disrupt the military balance of power, can indirect threats to
military security or direct threats to military and political security create
the kind of factual situation needed to satisfy the legal standard?
There are some unsettling problems with the idea that military developments producing an indirect threat to a state's political security entitle that state to invoke anticipatory self-defense as a justification for the
use of force designed to stop those developments from reaching fruition.
Admittedly, pressure deriving from weaponry developments may serve
1977) on the fact that states create international legal principles which reflect and capture their
interests.
109 In doing this, legal systems might attempt to minimize the number of occasions when thorough examination of a legal principle's underlying policies and values will take place. Stated another, to reassess the social, economic, political, and moral underpinnings of every legal principle in
dispute in every case would be extravagantly wasteful. See generally Gjerdingen, Legal Consciousness and the Modern Theory of Law, 35 BUFFALO L. REV. (forthcoming 1986), on idea that legal
systems endeavor to optimize efficiency. As best as can be determined, no one seems to argue that in
fact efficiency should be optimized.
no This query is not meant to suggest an answer, since it is possible that all efforts should be
directed towards a world free of the use of force, even though such is at the expense of the human
condition, individual creativity and initiative. Reference should be made, however, to Solzhenitsyn,
MisconceptionsAbout Russia Are a Threat to America, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 797 832 (1980), where he
recounts instances in which Soviet soldiers felt so strongly about values other than self-preservation
that they refused to obey commands in the face of known summary execution. See also Tucker, The
Nuclear Debate, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 1, 18-22 (1984), noting that Vatican 11 (1965) and the recent
American Catholic Bishops Pastoral Letter on nuclear weapons do not condemn all uses of such,
even though it is clear that any use might completely destroy most of civilization.
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to complicate relations between the state incurring the indirect threat
and the third state subjected to the pressure. Burdened by the clear or
unspoken expectations that international policy choices will be in the interest of the state which uses the weaponry developments to its advantage, the state subjected to the pressure can often be counted on to
perform as expected. Nevertheless, if relations between the superpowers
involved happen to reach the point of serious crisis, the distinct likelihood is that the state or states facing the military threat will side with a
power with whom cultural, economic, and political affinity is most
widely shared. Given this, gains indirectly threatening another state's
political security may prove quite ephemeral and make it difficult for the
threatened state to advance a satisfactory explanation to justify preemptive force.
Beyond this, however, there is at least one additional problem. Pressure from developments in the field of weaponry can undoubtedly produce indirect threats to political security. But the fact that the exertion
of the pressure is separated from the resultant threat to political security
by one or more states, necessarily opens the door for the entry of influences that will act upon the ability of the pressure to actually produce a
threat. This not only makes the certainty that political security will be
jeopardized less apparent, but also increases the chances that motives
independent of those generated by weaponry developments serve to drive
the wedges of discontent between the states concerned. Under such circumstances, there may be real difficulties in identifying a threat sufficient
to warrant anticipatory action.
If the focus of attention is narrowed to direct threats to military and
political security, the problems associated with indirect threats are less
pronounced. Since the state benefiting from the military developments is
aiming the newly obtained weapons at targeted locations within the state
from which it desires concessions, the likelihood that a crisis will reveal
the military advantage as ephemeral is somewhat reduced. A direct
threat to military and political security does not depend upon the behavior of third states conforming to the expectations generated by pressure
exerted by a state with a military advantage. Whether a targeted superpower finds itself with or without allies during a period of crisis is immaterial. Facing a direct threat, the chances are increased that the targeted
state will feel a distinct need to make concessions on matters which, from
time to time, may be of vital importance.
The problem with the entry of influences that could affect whether a
military advantage actually produces a threat to security can be seen in a
similar light. The absence of the intermediate link of third states minimizes the chances that various influences will serve to neutralize the impact of the weaponry developments on the targeted state's military and
political security. This is not to say, however, that such influence cannot
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exist. It only serves to emphasize that since the threat arises directly
rather than indirectly, the chances of that influence existing are that
much more reduced. As a consequence, there is a greater likelihood that
a necessity sufficient to justify the use of preemptive force will be present.
This would occur if a shift in the military balance of power would result
from technological innovations which offered few opportunities for
human ineptitude to spoil their impact, and if the shift could produce a
situation where the advantaged state would have military superiority that
neutralized the threatened state's capability to credibly invoke the use of
superiority. In the face of such dominance, is it not likely that concessions on matters of grave consequence would be forthcoming?
IV.

DEFENSIVE MILITARY SYSTEMS

A.

Initial Obstacles
While there may be instances where anticipatory measures of selfdefense would seem appropriate against a distant future threat to a nation's security deriving from efforts to shift the military balance of power
there is also another view. For instance, what if a threat faced by a nation is not manifested through efforts designed to result in production of
an offensive, but rather through production of a defensive military system? There appear to be two reasons for suggesting this question. First,
as already indicated, the Caroline standard speaks of permitting the use
of preemptive self-defense whenever the threat responded to is one which
leaves "no moment for deliberation." In view of the very nature of a
defensive military system, which is designed to be insulative and protective rather than external and aggressive, it is difficult to imagine a system
presenting a threat of the requisite character-that is, an imminent
threat. Second, the Caroline incident involved nothing more than a
claimed threat of an offensive nature. Moreover, discussion about the
concept of imminent attack has naturally led to attention being focused
on threats presented by offensive military systems.'1 1 Defensive systems,
therefore, might be seen as beyond the scope of legitimate anticipatory
measures.
As stated earlier, the traditional standard's reference to a threat
"leaving no moment for deliberation" could be read to mean that it is
directed at minimizing the risk of anticipatory action being taken when
there is no threat it really serves to preempt.112 This shifts attention
away from the notion of immediate proximity of time. In the instant
context, the net result is to make clear that no difference exists between
offensive and defensive systems which present a threat otherwise subject
I11
M.

See e.g., L.

supra note 3, at 142-45; J. STONE, OF LAW AND NATIONS 9 (1974);
F. FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 238-40.
112 See supra Part II.
HENKIN,

McDOUGAL AND
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to preemptive measures. If imminence is understood to mean a high degree of urgency, one might be inclined to such a differentiation. 13 But
there is nothing unique in an offensive as opposed to a defensive military
system which makes the latter inherently incapable of presenting a threat
of sufficient clarity to justify preemptive action. If the existence of a
threat is sufficiently clear to minimize the chance that anticipatory force
may be used mistakenly, why should it matter that the threat derives
from a defensive system? Preemptive action would seem appropriate unless some other reason exists for its disqualification.
With respect to both the nature of the claimed threat that led to the
articulation of the traditional standard, and the preoccupation of commentators with the use of anticipatory self-defense against offensive systems, it need merely be reiterated that the basic emphasis of the
traditional standard is on the existence of "necessity." That commentators have dealt with the right in the context of a threatened attack from
offensive weapons, and that the dispute in the mid-19th Century between
Great Britain and the United States which gave rise to the verbal configuration of the right happened to have involved a threat of an offensive
nature should not obscure this basic point. Proper analysis is concerned
only with determining the existence or nonexistence of necessity. If necessity is found to exist, it would not seem to matter that it is produced
by a defensive threat. Acceptance of any other view would impinge on
the value of defense of self without producing equivalent benefits for the
value against the use of force.114 Accordingly, the most important consideration when examining the availability of a right to anticipatory action against defensive systems is the factual matter of whether such
systems can ever create a threat sufficient to warrant forceful action directed at their removal.
B.

Can Defensive Systems Produce Sufficient "Necessity"?

The nub of the inquiry concerning anticipatory self-defense against
defensive military systems is indeed whether such systems can ever produce a threat sufficient to warrant action directed at their removal.
Without a sufficient threat, "necessity" would not exist. And without
necessity, even the most accurate perception regarding the existence of
113 As a general proposition, imminence and offensive threats often go together. It does not
follow from this, however, that defensive weapons systems cannot produce threats which are immi-

nent in nature.
114 If anticipatory self-defense were not to be permitted against defensive weapons systems, we
could well have a situation where the same effects produced by offensive weapons systems-against
which preemption can be exercised---could not be prevented whenever the military instrumentality
used to produce such is defensive. The advantages of using offensive force are gained at the expense
of the value of defense of self. Again, however, any assessment of conflicting values suggested herein
should be regarded as tentative. See supra note 62.
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the threat would not justify the invocation of self-defense. In examining
the nature of the threat presented by defensive military systems, it must
be recognized that technological innovation in the upcoming decades
may provide the capability to fashion systems which can give not only
piece meal tactical protection against external offensive threats (e.g., sophisticated and advanced anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft weapons, antisubmarine submarines), but also systems which can give enveloping strategic protection that insulates the possessor from threats posed by all
principal offensive military systems (e.g., high power microwave devices,
electromagnetic pulse weapons, impenetrable energy shields). Without
yet indicating whether systems on either end of the spectrum create the
requisite necessity, it is obvious that whatever necessity they do create
varies according to which end of the spectrum attention is directed.
Defensive systems offering tactical protection undoubtedly reduce
the effectiveness of another state's offensive military systems. By frustrating or complicating the success of the offensive systems' objectives,
the defensive systems produce a certain vulnerability that would not
otherwise exist. Whenever offensive systems cannot, or cannot as easily,
accomplish their prescribed mission, the ability of the directing state to
protect itself is distinctly affected. Because it is caused by the defensive
system, the effect suggests that the very existence of that system presents
a threat.
Defensive systems capable of providing enveloping strategic protection from all principal offensive military systems of another state would
pose a qualitatively distinct threat. Systems able to provide such protection may never be developed. The fast pace of technological innovation,
however, would suggest that development is not beyond the realm of possibility. If put in place, such systems would be capable of neutralizing
the most significant offensive weapons systems of an opponent. When
coupled with weaponry able to place the opponent under the peril of an
attack which could inflict a level of destruction considered unacceptable,
the defensive systems could bring about capitulation without an even
near launch of an offensive attack.
In the immediate future, the closest that military technologists may
bring us to a defensive system capable of insulating its possessor from the
principal offensive weapons of an opponent will probably be found in the
Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative---or "Star Wars"proposal. Star Wars falls short of a completely insulative defensive system in that any success it will have will be primarily to prevent strategic
missiles of an opponent from reaching targeted locations. Air and sealaunched cruise missiles (ALCMs and SLCMs) with nuclear warheads,
as well as other delivery platforms or methods of introducing nuclear
charges into the United States will be much more difficult to deal with.
Focusing just on strategic missiles, estimates of the overall effectiveness
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of the Star Wars system vary. The most optimistic assessments have not
gone further than to suggest that a system with components able to destroy strategic missiles in the boost, mid-course, and terminal phases
could have a success rate in the vicinity of ninety-nine percent.' 15 Depending on the number of strategic warheads in one's nuclear arsenal,
this could result in a large or small number of warheads penetrating to
reach preassigned destinations.
The kind of threat which may be said to create a necessity which
justifies the use of force in self-defense could be like the one referred to
before in the context of threats to the military balance of power. That
threat is one which raises a reasonably certain risk of imposed political
judgment regarding the manner in which a state is expected to behave on
matters of vital importance. The Caroline teaches that a state can preserve its territorial integrity or political independence by anticipatory action. The fact that the principle of anticipatory action grew out of a
situation involving a threat of offensive force is more reflective of the
state of technology then extant than of any notion that the principle is
limited to responses to threats of an offensive nature. Is there no merit at
all to the suggestion that anticipatory action otherwise justified is permitted, irrespective of whether directed at an offensive or defensive threat?
Such action promotes the value of defense of self, a value which the principle of the Caroline incident holds to be of great importance. It does so,
moreover, without contravening the value against the use of force, since
to be justified the anticipatory action must only be taken when the existence of the threat to which it responds is sufficiently clear.
Against this background, it may be argued that military systems on
the tactical end of the defensive spectrum cannot present a threat sufficient to create a necessity to take preemptive measures directed at
preventing completion of their deployment. Such systems are designed
to do nothing more than to provide some degree of operational protection for offensive weaponry which can then be used to jeopardize the
territorial integrity or political independence of another state. The protection provided is less than complete.
Defensive systems which envelop their protection from all principal
offensive weapons of an opponent, however, may well create a necessity
to take measures designed to prevent the completion of deployment.
These systems do more than offer some protection; they insulate the possessor from all external military threats and therefore have the effect of
neutralizing the weaponry of an opponent. In doing so, the defensive
system has accomplished what would have otherwise required an incomprehensibly substantial offensive attack. It has eliminated the opponent's
1I
(1984).

Burrows, Ballistic Missile Defense: The Illusion of Security, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 843, 852
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ability to protect itself by depriving the opponent of the power to
threaten effective use of its own offensive weapons. The end product is
an opponent subject to the political dictates of the state possessing the
defensive system. The mere deployment of the system has created a situation in which an opponent can be told how to act on matters of vital
importance. Deployment would also violate that direction of the risk of
a military strike capable of being made with impunity.
Defensive systems which fall short of providing complete insulation,
but which have the capability of preventing a large portion of an opponent's principal offensive weapons from reaching targeted destinations,
pose a difficult problem. To the extent that they can destroy enough
offensive weapons to affect an opponent's ability to protect its territorial
integrity or political independence, it might be inappropriate to consider
such systems as analogous to run-of-the-mill tactical defensive systems.
A defensive system offering complete insulation presents a threat sufficient to create a necessity which justifies actions directed at removal because the system will neutralize an opponent's offensive weaponry.
Neutralization, however, does not necessarily depend upon a one-hundred percent effective defensive system. All that would seem to be
needed is the ability to destroy a sufficient number of principal offensive
weapons so to leave the opponent without enough fire-power to inflict a
high enough level of damage which would deter the possessor of the defensive system from ever credibly threatening to use its own offensive
weapons. Any system capable of accomplishing that task may give the
deploying state the leverage to exact significant international political
control on matters of great consequence. Such a threat to independence
of judgment may well be argued as being susceptible to preemptive measures of self-defense since a threat of that sort is precisely what the Caroline standard sought to address. From this perspective, Star Wars would
appear 16to fail to present itself as subject to justifiable anticipatory
1
action.
V.

OF COUNTERMEASURES AND NEcEssITY

It has been shown above that it is possible to make reasonable arguments in favor of anticipatory self-defense being invoked against developments which present a distant future threat of actual attack, threats to
security proceeding from efforts to create military disequilibrium, and
developments which might result in the eventual completion of a defensive weapons system. With respect to these matters, however, inquiry
cannot be limited to the points already examined. As stated early in this
essay, the traditional standard governing the use of preemptive action
116 See Zedalis, On the Lawfulness of Forceful Remedies for Violations of Arms ControlAgreements: "Star Wars" and Other Glimpses at the Future, supra note 101 at 157.
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requires not only a necessity of self-defense which leaves no moment for
deliberation, but one which leaves "no choice of means" as well. And
beyond even that directive, the actual diplomatic correspondence in the
Caroline incident requires that "nothing unreasonable or excessive [be
done] since the act [of preemption], justified by the necessity of self-de' ' 117
fense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.
These additional components round out the law of anticipatory self-defense by focusing on the idea that force should be used only after it has
been determined that no other responsive countermeasures (e.g., peaceful
means or countermilitary developments) exist," 8 and that the degree of
force which ultimately is used is proportionate to the threat against
which it is directed.
A.

Need for Effective Countermeasures

Much has been written about the concept of proportionality. 119 The
absence of comparable literature on countermeasures suggests that some
consideration of that matter might be appropriate. An important starting point would appear to be acknowledgment of the fact that countermeasures may take many forms. In that respect, it should be noted that
the use of diplomatic interchange and negotiation would almost always
be required.1 0 Aside from these, countermeasures would seem to fall
into either the category of defensive protection or that of offensive buildup, both of which are, in the first instance, designed to drive home the
futility of trying to capitalize on threatening innovations. 121 It would
appear, however, that resort to one of these categories of countermeasures, rather than to the use of force, must be had only if it can be said
that the countermeasure which happens to be available would prove
1 22
effective.

117 See supra note 1.
118 See supra notes 2 (second paragraph) and 68, on idea that recourse to non-forceful countermeasures derives from the Caroline'srequirement of "no choice of means." Further, commentators
have captured that requirement in the reference to "imminence." Imminence, however, also cap-

tures the Caroline's other notion, that of temporal proximity or immediacy in time.
119 See eg., M. McDOUGAL AND F. FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 241-44; I. BROWNLIE, supra
note 3, at 261-64; Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, supra note 2, at 1637-38.
120 See Schachter, id., at 1635 ("force should not be considered necessary until peaceful measures have been found wanting"). If resort to peaceful measures may prevent self-defense from being
effective or result in greater destruction, then it would seem that recourse to such measures would
not be a precondition to the use of force.
121 An offensive build-up may be directed either at outstripping or neutralizing an offensive
build-up of an opponent, or at overwhelming or neutralizing an opponent's defensive capability.
122 Though emphasizing the idea of "necessity," and not limiting the countermeasures of concern to defensive protection or offensive buildup, Schachter, The Right ofStates to the Armed Forces,
supra note 2, at 1635 notes: "It would be hard to deny the necessity of forcible action in... [a case
of imminent threat involving danger to lives coupled with a demand for concessions] on the ground
that a peaceful means might succeed." (Emphasis added).
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Currently there exists no explicit principle of international law
which directs effectiveness. Nevertheless, the need for effectiveness
would seem to proceed from the fact that any other approach would
either jeopardize the survival of members of the international community, or result in their successful protection at the expense of substantial
damage being suffered before forceful measures of self-defense can restore
parity between the contending states. After all, to conclude that a state
must use even ineffective alternatives before it resorts to force, could
place the state in a position where it could only draw upon force against
aggression aimed at the state's extinction well after the likelihood that
force proving able of impeding such action has vanished or through time
has reached the point that extinction can be prevented by nothing short
of great loss to life and property. As long as self-defense is to retain
international recognition, and although the destructive properties of the
use of force result in its general condemnation, perhaps the best approach
regarding countermeasures is one which preserves the value of defense of
self, while seeking an overall lower level of destruction. Effectiveness satisfies this objective. It permits a state to do what is needed to protect its
survival by not compelling it to pursue countermeasures which may
prove their worthlessness too late for force to work or to work in a time
12 3
frame that results in greater destruction than might otherwise occur.
In dealing with the idea of effectiveness, it would seem important to
observe that it is an idea shaped by the interplay of a variety of factors.
The most important factors appear to be the scientific, industrial, and
technological capability of the state concerned, as well as the amount of
time available to permit those three phenomena to yield tangible results.
The existence of objective evidence indicating that a state in fact possesses the scientific, industrial, and technological capability to develop
countermeasures is critically indicative of the presence of a countermeasure's effectiveness. That evidence may be affected, however, if deployment of the external threat itself. For example, a countermeasure,
though objectively capable of neutralizing an external threat, may require more time to develop, test, and deploy than is available. By the
time the countermeasure can be made fully operational, a threat of actual
attack from offensive weaponry, or a threat to the balance of power from
offensive or defensive military systems, may already be in motion. Similarly, a state faced with an external threat might be able to expedite its
research and development and deploy an operational system in a timely
fashion. But timely deployment can be nullified if the system lacks the
sophistication needed to deter or neutralize the external threat. Clearly,
123 Any course which results in greater destruction than might otherwise occur contravenes
the value against the use of force. See supra note 62 on tentative nature of the value assessment
suggested here.
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science, industry, technology, and time work together to determine
whether a state is able to develop effective countermeasures.
B.

Degree of Effectiveness

Related to the need for effectiveness is the question of what the degree of likelihood of effectiveness should be. It must be emphasized again
that, at present, there is no explicit principle of international law which
enjoins a standard. Some obvious standards, however, might include any
possibility of effectiveness, reasonable likelihood of effectiveness, high
probability of effectiveness, or absolute certainty of effectiveness. Given
the fact that the rationale-upon which the need for effectiveness itself
rests-seeks to avoid jeopardizing the survival of members of the international community, or placing them in a position where successful defense
of self comes at the expense of substantial devastation, might it not be
that the most appropriate of the suggested standards is that of absolute
certainty? Obviously, the big problem with this standard is that absolute
certitude in political affairs is virtually unattainable. As for high
probability of effectiveness, it would tend to promote quite adequately
the value of defense of self and that aspect of the value against the use 1of
24
force designed to limit or minimize destruction when force is used.
But even so stringent a standard as high probability, let alone one satisfied by a lesser showing (such as reasonable likelihood of effectiveness or
any possibility of effectiveness) would certainly admit of occasions where
defense of self could be accomplished only after much damage has already been inflicted in an effort to restore some sense of equilibrium between the threatening and the defending state. Unless one is prepared to
argue that the value against the use of force is always preeminent, what,
other than the difficulty of showing absolute certainty, exists to suggest a
lesser standard? Absolute certainty, which is intended here to refer to
nothing other than a degree of effectiveness identifiable through empirical inquiry and prediction, would assure more thorough promotion of the
value against the use of force, while striking a balance with the value in
favor of defense of self. Only in situations where an objective observer
would conclude that there exists an absolutely certain and effective countermeasure must the threatened state refrain from having immediate recourse to armed force to protect itself. Doubt regarding effectiveness
would permit force to be used to assure that vital interests remained protected. It goes without saying, of course, that the amount and character
124 The value of defense of self would be promoted by the fact that "high probability" would
allow a threatened state to use defensive force whenever countermeasures could not satisfy that
standard. The value against the use of force would be promoted by requiring countermeasures satisfying the "high probability" standard to be developed and prohibiting the use of force where the
opportunity to satisfy the standard exists.
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of defensive force used in such a situation is governed by the principle of
proportionality.
The fact that absolute certainty meshes with the rationale underpinning the notion of effectiveness 125 is not the sole reason why that standard suggests itself. Absolute certainty also appears to establish an
internal consistency with the idea of reasonable certainty, discussed earlier in the context of one state's perception regarding the existence of a
threat posed by another. Under that idea, a state which perceives itself
as facing a reasonably certain threat may undertake measures of selfdefense whenever measures of that nature are otherwise permitted by international law 126 even if it may later be determined that the state was in
fact mistaken in its assessment of the circumstances indicating a threat.
This permits a margin of error on the side of the state claiming selfdefense. A margin of error of similar character would result from application of the standard of absolute certainty in connection with the degree
of a countermeasure's effectiveness. By authorizing the use of preemptive force whenever an objective observer would conclude that
nonforceful countermeasures absolutely certain to be effective do not exist, any error regarding that assessment would prove to the benefit of the
state invoking self-defense. If the standard of a countermeasure's effectiveness were the less strict test of high probability, the margin of error
would not fall on the side of the state acting to protect itself against an
external threat. 127 The result would be a standard inconsistent with the
standard used to measure another important constituent of the law of
anticipatory self-defense-that governing the state of mind of the nation
invoking self-defense.
C.

What If CountermeasuresAbsolutely Certain to be Effective Exist?
Should what has been said regarding the existence or nonexistence

125 As will be recalled, see supranotes 119-127 and accompanying text, the notion of "effectiveness" derives from the accommodation of the value of defense of self and the value against the use of
force. The accommodation suggests that, without a need for a countermeasure to be effective before
a threatened state can be said to have an obligation to develop such, the survival of members of the
world community would be jeopardized or could be successfully protected only at the expense of
having first suffered substantial damage. By suggesting that the degree of effectiveness be that of
"absolute certainty," the accommodation between the two values is strengthened. Unless a
threatened state has access to a countermeasure, the effectiveness of which is absolutely certain, it is
permitted to resort to force in self-defense. In doing so, the state assures its survival as a member of
the world community, and minimizes the amount of damage that would have to be suffered to
determine whether or not a countermeasure less certain to be effective actually works.
126 Reference here is to the ideas of proportionality and countermeasures, in particular.
127 If it was determined that a state had the capability to develop in a timely fashion countermeasures holding out a high probability of being able to neutralize an external threat before that
threat matured, immediate resort to defensive force would not be permissible, even though the countermeasures might later prove ineffective.

PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS

of countermeasures absolutely certain to be effective be viewed as indicating the unlawfulness of preemptive force designed to deal with an external threat when countermeasures absolutely certain to be effective do in
fact exist? The Caroline standard's reference to a necessity of self-defense
"leaving no choice of means" can be read to suggest that resort to preemptive force is never necessary when a state has access to effective
nonforceful countermeasures. To have countermeasures of that sort
means they must be used. On the other hand might it not be suggested
that if the words used to express international legal standards are understood as devices for presenting the entire spectrum of implicated policies
and values to the decisionmakers, necessity which justifies the use of preemptive force can exist, notwithstanding the availability of effective
countermeasures ? That a state has access to effective countermeasures
does not in every instance preclude that state from having to resort to
force in self-defense.12 The existence of nonforceful countermeasures is
extraordinarily important, but it is only one of the many considerations
which determine the lawfulness of anticipatory action.
At least one distinguished authority seems to have left open the latter suggestion by writing that the existence of necessity is determined by
reference to, among other things, "[t]he nature and consequentiality of
[the threatening state's] objectives, the character of its internal institutional structures [and] the kind of world public order it demands."12' 9
The fact that that statement was probably made without considering
countermeasures may well be reflected by the absence of any effort to set
forth real life illustrations where the defensive use of force might be permissible, notwithstanding the existence of nonforceful measures for addressing the threat involved.' 3 ° Nevertheless, is the suggestion of the
effect of the mentioned considerations on the existence of necessity totally without merit when placed in the context of a Nazi Germany? Had
there been reasonable certainty in the mid-1930s that Hitler posed a
threat of future attack to European countries (a matter of which the evidence may be equivocal),13 1 and had the Allies been willing and capable
128 Cf. Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, supra note 2, at 1635, taking the
approach that where an invasion or attack is already in progress, the state in peril need not resort to
peaceful means of resolution, "irrespective of probabilities as to the effectiveness of peaceful settlement." This suggests that there is at least one instance where values more important than that
against the use of force may exist.
129 M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, supra note 2, at 230.
130 Id.
131 See A. TAYLOR, THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 17 (2d ed. 1961) (indicating

some governmental officials felt from the very beginning that they knew Hitler's plans); 97-110 (suggesting that the reoccupation of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936, marked a turning point); 128
(stating that the Anschluss - annexation of Austria - fixed the beginning of the pre-war). See also
R. ALBRECHT-CARRIE, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

497-528 (1973).
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of embarking on a military build-up absolutely certain of deterring Nazi
aggression (a matter of which the evidence seems to reveal a lack of resolve),' 3 2 would the law have not supported a preemptive strike designed
to remove the Nazi regime? If the Caroline standard's reference to "necessity of self-defense ...
leaving no choice of means" indicates that
necessity is absent when countermeasures are present, then the answer is
obvious. Under no circumstances would the use of defensive force have
been justified. But is this the approach international law should take?
By compelling a course of action that would lead to the development of
countermeasures, the law may force the diversion of huge sums of
money, labor, and intellectual power from more humane, productive,
and creative pursuits. Is the value against the use of force, notwithstanding that the force may be purely defensive, so weighty that it will invariably tip the scales in the direction of countermeasures? Does it not matter
that compelling the development of such means that many social, economic, medical, educational, and other problems go unredressed and
thus worsen? And beyond this, does it not matter that by disapproving
the use of preemptive force a tyrannical, repressive, and predatory regime
may be allowed to remain in power? Think of the untold number of
political, racial, and religious atrocities which could have been averted in
Germany had the Allies been ready and had the law been willing to permit them to topple the Nazi regime. Is the value against the use of force
unapproachable by any value or combination of values with which it
conflicts?"' 33
D. Balancing of Values
In a situation where the existence of an external threat is reasonably
certain, and countermeasures absolutely certain to be effective can be developed before the threat matures, there may be a value in favor of
human dignity.' 34 This value would be in addition to the more involved
values against the use of force and in defense of self which together
should be considered in determining the appropriateness of immediate
132 On isolationism and suspicion of the arms industry in the United States, see R. CHALLENER, FROM ISOLATION TO CONTAINMENT, 1921-1952 at 65-85 (1970). On the disarmament interest of the Allied powers during the interwar years, see R. FERRELL, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: A
HISTORY 518-25 (1975). On the policy of nonintervention in the Spanish Civil War, see R. ALBRECHT-CARRIE, supra note 131, at 502-04.
133 The advent of thermonuclear weapons, perhaps capable of eliminating civilization, is an
extraordinarily weighty consideration. See Sagan, Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: Some
Policy Implications, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 257 (1983-84). It should not, however, overshadow the fact
that there may be situations where the military force appropriate is significantly less destructive. At
present, the author is in the process of preparing a substantial study identifying and balancing the
conflict values involved in situations involving self-defense.
134 See M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, supra note 2, at 2, 4 and 11 (expressing view that the
promotion of this value is the objective of international law). Contrasupra note 62.
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resort to defensive force rather than to the development of neutralizing
countermeasures. Could it be that the value of human dignity places a
premium on the dedication of economic and intellectual resources to the
resolution of day to day human problems? If it does, might it not be
possible that a state which has immediate resort to defensive force in
order to assure the availability of resources for addressing the problems
of its own or another state's people, should have its choice of defensive
force, rather than countermeasures, embraced?1 35 Should the possibility
be foreclosed if there ever exists a situation in which the plight of those
living in object misery not be unredressed in order to promote the value
against the use of force, when force used in derogation thereof is purely
defensive?136 Might it not be possible that the value in favor of human
dignity would result in the approval of defensive force which not only
protects the state having recourse thereto but liberates the indigenous
population of the state attacked from the oppression of despotic rule?137
To be sure, the nature and extent of the resources made available for
dealing with pressing human problems as a result of accepting the right
to use defensive force immediately (though effective-countermeasures are
available) will shape any conclusion regarding the lawfulness of the force
used in any particular situation. How could it be suggested otherwise, if
relatively little expense would be involved in developing neutralizing
countermeasures? 138 By turning in the direction of immediate use of defensive force, perhaps not enough resources would be freed up to make
the slightest dent in the eradication of social, medical, economic, or educational problems, or political repression and inhumane abuse. Yet even
in instances where the drain on money, labor, and intellectual power
which the development of countermeasures might cause could be staggering, there may still be no assurance that the appropriate course is to
approve the immediate use of defensive force. Are there no problems
with which humankind must endure to avoid the number of occasions
135 This type of situation might involve immediate resort to defensive force which has the effect
of freeing-up economic, medical, and intellectual resources for use in addressing problems faced by
the peoples of the state using such force or peoples of other states. Compelling the state using
defensive force to develop neutralizing countermeasures may prevent these problems from being
addressed.
136 It bears emphasis that no views are expressed in this Article about the use of offensive force,
irrespective of the arguments advanced in claimed justification. See text accompanying infra note
141.
137 It is not difficult to imagine that both of these objectives may be accomplished in some
cases. However, it may be sufficient that the defensive objective is promoted, with the concommitant
result being the ability to devote resources that would otherwise have been committed to countermeasures to more constructive forms of activity.
138 If the development of neutralizing countermeasures will be a relatively inexpensive and
simple task, the use of defensive force will free up little that can have applicability elsewhere. Thus,
the value of defense of self may not be joined with sufficient promotion of other values to warrant a
lower ordering of the value against the use of force.
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where the value against the use of force is violated?' 39 And, are the

problems with which different peoples suffer of greater or lesser magnitude according the cultural environment in which they appear, though
the problems may not actually differ at all in degree between one societal
grouping and another? 4 °
By no stretch of the imagination is the suggestion being advanced
that the use of force is appropriate when it promotes noble objectives or
higher ends. Distinct from some recent soundings in favor of the use of

force in such situations, 4 ' the point made here is simply that it is not

completely unreasonable to suggest that there may well be instances
where defensive force may appropriately be used, though absolutely effective neutralizing countermeasures could be developed, if the use of the
defensive force promotes values considered of essential importance. No
view at all is expressed herein on whether offensive force may be used to
promote such values, and this cannot be stressed strongly enough. With
regard to either offensive or defensive force, however, we should be wary
of principles characterized as law which serve to paralyze our ability to
make moral choices. 142 Law provides the benefit of predictability,' 4 3 but
predictability never has, nor perhaps should it ever be permitted to, stop
growth and change in the law. " Rules or standards of law are nothing
other than word formulae designed to serve as vehicles for discussion
about the values which those formulae implicate. To acknowledge this is
to not only understand why the law changes, but to assure that every
legal question pushes to the bright center of the mind the matter of essential concern-which values should prevail and why.
139 How does one weigh such things as infant mortality rates, standards of living, levels of
education, psychological problems of citizens, cultural development, etc. against the absence of interstate violence? Is is not possible that while some of these can be weighed againt such, the weighing
of others against the absence of inter-state violence would be entirely inappropriate?
140 On the topic of cultural relativism to relation to human rights, see Teson, International
Human Rights and culturalRelativism, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 869 (1985). Also, one must not lose sight
of the fact that there is even no universal view on condemnation of the use of force. See Bozeman,
War and The Clash of Ideas, 20 ORBIS 61, 76-101 (1976).
141 See Reisman, Coercionand Self-Determination: Construing CharterArticle 2(4), 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 642 (1984) (approving use of force to overthrow totalitarian states).
142 In the Corfu Channel Case 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Judgment), the court stated, in response to a
claim by the United Kingdom regarding the use of force:
The Court cannot accept such a line of defense. The Court can only regard the alleged
right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given
rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organization, find a place in international law.
Clearly the potential for abuse is always present. Without assuming that risk in order to advance
values other than that against the use of force, law may become the instrument of wrong doing.
143 See H. HART, supra note 106 and accompanying text.
144 See supra note 28, indicating that from time to time long-standing legal principles are radically altered to reflect new assessments of the values involved. This is accomplished in spite of the
recognized importance of the value of predictability.
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CONCLUSION

From what has preceded, three general points seem to emerge.
First, the language of both the Caroline standard and the usual rephrasing of that standard suggested by commentators raise what seem to be
insurmountable difficulties when evaluating whether anticipatory self-defense may be invoked against (1) distant future threats of actual attack,
(2) threats to the military balance of power, (3) threats presented by defensive military systems, or (4) threats sufficiently distant in time to permit the development of effective countermeasures. A distant future
threat of attack cannot be said to present a threat which is "imminent,"
or which leaves "no moment for deliberation." A threat to the military
balance of power is neither a threat which is "imminent" nor a threat of
"attack." A threat presented by a defensive military system is neither a
threat of "attack" nor an offensive threat like that which justified the use
of anticipatory force in the Caroline incident itself. A threat which can
be met with neutralizing countermeasures before the threat matures
enough to become operational cannot be said to be a threat leaving "no
choice of means."
Second, to view the words of the traditional standard governing anticipatory self-defense as having some essential, objective, and plain
meaning is to misunderstand the very nature of the words of legal rules.
In the final analysis, the words of rules act as instruments for presentation to officials who make decisions about the lawfulness of relevant conduct and the full range of policies and values that, in different contexts,
may be implicated. Of necessity, then, discussion should focus on the
policies and values which happen to find themselves in conflict, not on
whether the relevant conduct is within the ambit of particular language.
An approach of this sort breaks away from the conventional method of
analysis. What is deeply troubling, however, is the uncertainty about
whether the suggested approach lacks sensitivity to that which "goes
without saying" after the death and destruction of two World Wars.
Could it be that those who have managed to keep vivid the impression of
the horror produced by such cataclysms better appreciate the true weight
of the value against the use of force? Or, alternatively, could it be that
that which so many have assumed goes without saying actually fails to
rest on solid ground?145 The complexities implicit in these questions
seem to merit full exploration.
The third and final general point which emerges is that when one
moves away from the determination imposed by the language of the
145 In addition to the fear of nuclear annihilation, it has recently been suggested that the value
of pluralism (i.e., economic and political diversity) is extremely important in assessing questions
regarding the use of force. See Schachter, In Defense of Rules on the Use of Force, supra note 2, at
144.
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traditional formulation of the standard governing anticipatory self-defense, and moves towards an approach that elevates the significance of
relevant policies and values, arguments in favor of a broader view of permissible preemptive action do not seem to be completely lacking in merit.
While no attempt is made to identify and weigh each and every policy
and value implicated in the factual situations discussed, there would
seem to be every reason to believe that an exhaustive survey and assessment may not completely foreclose anticipatory action in instances where
a language-oriented essential meaning approach would indicate unlawfulness. Since the references to "imminent" and to "no moment for deliberation" serve to minimize the chances of mistake, the value of defense
of self might be preferred whenever the existence of an actual attack at
some future point is sufficiently clear. The reference to an imminent "attack" may not always elevate the value against the use of force to a position of preeminence; if the totality of circumstances suggest that a
threatened shift in the military balance of power, or in the scheduled
deployment of a defensive military system, creates a "necessity" for preferring the value of defense of self and other values which support of
defense of self might advance. The fact that the capability to develop
neutralizing countermeasures before a future threat matures means that a
state cannot claim "no choice of means," and may not prevent immediate
resort to anticipatory force whenever allowance of such would promote
values deemed more important than that against the use of force.
If there is a litmus test for assessing the ultimate wisdom of the approach suggested in the foregoing pages, it may be one which asks
whether the approach comports with the expected behavior of states; to
put it another way, with international political reality.146 Judged by such
a standard, it is difficult to know whether there is wisdom in taking a
broader view of anticipatory self-defense in each of the instances to
which attention has been devoted. The Israeli aerial attack on the Tamuz I nuclear reactor indicates that states may act to preempt a distant
future threat of actual attack. Even if the stakes involve nuclear annihilation, it is unlikely that one nation which knows of a nuclear strike
planned by another will sit by and resign itself to simply suffer the first
blow.147 With regard to threats to the military balance of power, the
Cuban Missile Crisis suggests that nations may be willing to use more
than mere diplomatic pressure to prevent threats which directly jeopardize military and political security from reaching fruition. While it is unclear whether the measures employed will involve the use of force, there
146 Cf. L. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 97-8 (indicating that the most successful part of law is that
part which reflects existing mores of how those governed do and ought to behave).
147 See L. HENKIN, id. at 142-44 (stating, however, that this should not result in approval of
anticipatory self-defense as a legal principle); McDougal, supra note 10, at 600-01; J. STONE, OF
LAW AND NATIONS 9 (1974).
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should be no doubt about the inclination to advise that force be used.148
Defensive military systems threatening a state's ability to make independent judgments on matters of vital importance might be handled in
a similar fashion. If negotiations to prevent deployment or efforts to develop offensive weapons able to overwhelm the system are found wanting, force may be viewed as a realistic option.
The only instance in which the practice of states may suggest a preference for the value against the use of force is in the development of
neutralizing countermeasures. Surely it would not stretch credulity too
far to imagine that there may very well have been some in the United
States who advocated limited nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union
after its detonation of an atomic weapon in September 1949.149 Conceivably, the argument of a preventive war as justification may have been
supplemented with the idea that it would free-up economic, intellectual,
and scientific resources that would otherwise be dedicated to an offensive
build-up to deter the Soviets from using their newly acquired capability;
resources that otherwise could be used to promote more human and productive pursuits. That is to say, from the standpoint of balancing conflicting values, values other than those against the use of force may have
been argued as preferable. As time has demonstrated, if such a suggestion were ever advanced, it proved unattractive. Nuclear strikes were
never taken. Instead, an offensive build-up to deter undesirable Soviet
conduct was preferred. Nevertheless, one should not be too quick to
draw any definite conclusion from this, for what actually occurred may
have been as much the result of a general American disinclination to use
force when unprovoked. Or it might be concluded that no other values
surfaced as preeminent, this being the result of a considered judgment
that as long as neutralizing countermeasures are available, force will
never be used since use can never be justified.

148 It has been reported that during the Cuban Missile crisis, for instance, Secretary of State
Dean Acheson, a lawyer, urged a bombing strike on the missile sites with which the administration
was concerned. R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 37-8
(1969).
149 See A. ULAM, EXPANSION AND COEXISTENCE: SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 1917-1973 499

(2d ed. 1974).

